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Injustice in Our Schools: Students' Free
Speech Rights Are Not Being Vigilantly
Protected
'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
(rather) than through any kind of authoritarian selection.' 2
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court made this pronouncement forty years
ago, explaining that students' constitutional rights, especially the right of free
speech, should be vigilantly protected in school. For many years the Supreme
Court and lower courts have been struggling to protect students' free speech
rights while allowing school officials to operate schools efficiently and
effectively. In the past this balance was struck in favor of protecting students'
rights by only allowing regulations that are necessary to avoid substantial
disruption to the school environment.' For the past fourteen years, however,
the balance has been struck in favor of schools and against protecting
students' rights by upholding the regulations of school officials as long as they
are reasonable." This lower standard of scrutiny for school regulations
imposed on students gives much deference to school authorities to determine
what regulations are appropriate and allows regulations that greatly restrict
students' rights of free speech.
This comment examines how federal courts have become increasingly
less vigilant about protecting the free speech rights of students of all ages. Part
I presents a historical review of Supreme Court cases that granted broad
freedom of speech to students. Part II introduces more recent Supreme Court
1. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
2. Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
3. See infra text accompanying note 22; see also Parts I.B-E.
4. See infra text accompanying note 61. Although the standard technically stated by
the Court is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," it has often been
interpreted to require only reasonableness.
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cases that have restricted students' free speech rights. Part Ill examines the

effects that the more recent Supreme Court decisions have had on lower courts
deciding cases regarding freedom of speech in schools. Part IV discusses how
the public forum doctrine has been utilized by the Supreme Court and lower

federal courts as a means of reducing students' free speech rights. Part V
analyzes the earliest to the most recent cases regarding student speech, and

demonstrates how federal courts have become less willing to protect the free
speech rights of students. Finally, Part VI proposes solutions that will help
strengthen students' freedom of speech despite the recent federal court
decisions that have been unwilling to do so.
I. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOLS
A. WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION V. BARNE7TIe

Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court set the first standard in defining
the First Amendment rights of elementary and high school students. In 1943,
in a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld students' rights to
free speech in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette."Barnette
involved a school board resolution that required all students to salute the
American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance at school.! If students failed
to comply with this requirement, they were expelled from school and were not
readmitted until they complied.' Several students who were members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the school policy, arguing that requiring them

5. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 626. The school board resolution stated in part:
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virginia Board of Education does hereby recognize
and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the United States-the right hand is
placed upon the breast and the following pledge repeated in unison: 'I pledge allegiance to the
Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all'-now becomes a regular part of the program of
activities in the public schools, supported in whole or in part by public funds, and that all
teachers as defined by law in West Virginia and pupils in such schools shall be required to
participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that
refusal to salute the flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
accordingly.
Id. at 626 n.2.
8. Id. at 629. Section 185(1) of the West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.) stated in part:
If a child be dismissed, suspended or expelled from school because of refusal of such child to
meet the legal and lawful requirements of the school and the established regulations of the
county and/or state board of education, further admission of the child to school shall be refused
until such requirement and regulations be complied with.
319 U.S. at 629 n.5.
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to salute the flag violated their religious beliefs.9 The Supreme Court held in
favor of the students and struck down the resolution as an unconstitutional
violation of the students' rights to express themselves."° Justice Jackson,
writing for the majority of the Court, explained that school officials must act
within the limits of the Bill of Rights and should be held responsible for
teaching children the value of the Constitution." The Court emphasized,
"educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes."' 2 The Court expressed that judicial review
of school administrators' action is important to make sure that school officials
are carrying out their responsibilities under the Constitution. 3 Emphasizing
that school officials should not be given absolute power, the Court announced
that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. "4
B. TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 5

The Supreme Court did not again address the issue of students' rights to
freedom of speech and expression until over twenty five years later. In1969
the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 majority, handed down the decision of Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District.6 In Tinker, three high
school students wore black armbands to symbolize their objection to the

9. Barnete, 319 U.S. at 629. The Jehovah's Witnesses believe that an obligation
imposed by the laws of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the government. Id. They
follow a literal reading of Exodus 20:4-5 which says: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any

graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth or
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor
serve them." 319 U.S. at 629. They consider the flag to be a"graven image" and refuse to salute
it. Id.

10. 319 U.S. at 642 ("[A]ction of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control.").
11. Id. at637.
12. Id. The Court set a clear line of when state officials may be allowed to restrict First
Amendment rights of individuals. According to the Court, First Amendment rights "are
susceptible ofrestriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state
may lawfully protect." Id. at 639.
13. Id. at 637-40.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 642.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Vietnam War.17 School officials suspended the students because they violated

8
a school policy that prohibited wearing arnbands while on school property.
The students sued, claiming the school violated their constitutional right to
express themselves freely, while the school officials argued that they could
prohibit wearing armbands because they might cause disruption and
disturbance at the school.' 9 The United States Supreme Court struck down the
school's prohibition against wearing armbands because the Court found the
school officials' alleged fears unpersuasive.20

In striking down the regulations, the Supreme Court in Tinker announced
a test to determine when school officials may prohibit expression and speech

in schools.2" The Court imposed a strict standard on school authorities by
allowing school officials to censor student speech only when it is shown that
"engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially

interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the

school."' 2 Justice Fortas, writing the majority opinion, stated that
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to

17. Id. at 504. A group of adults and students in Des Moines decided to publicize their
objections to the Vietnam War and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands between
December 16 and December 31. Id.
18. Id. The policy against wearing armbands was passed by principals of the Des
Moines schools after becoming aware of the plan to wear armbands. Id. Principals adopted the
new policy on December 14, two days before the date the group had set to begin wearing the
armbands. Id. The students were aware of the policy when they wore the armbands. Id.
19. Id. at 504-05. The school officials suggested that they feared disorder could occur
as a result of the students wearing the armbands. School officials explained, "A former student
of one of our high schools was killed in Viet Nam. Some of his friends are still in school and
it was felt that if any kind of demonstration existed, it might evolve into something which would
be difficult to control." Id. at 509 n.3. School officials also explained, "Students at one of the
high schools were heard to say they would wear arm bands of other colors if the black bands
prevailed." l
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. The Court found "the testimony of school authorities at
trial indicates that it was not a fear of disruption that motivated the regulation prohibiting the
armbands" but instead found that "the regulation was directed against 'the principal of the
demonstration' itself." Id. at 509 n.3. In examining the school officials' actions, the Supreme
Court came to the conclusion that "[s]chool authorities simply felt that 'the schools are no place
for demonstrations,' and if the students 'didn't like the way our elected officials were handling
things, it should be handled with the ballot box and not in the halls of our public schools."' Id.
21. Id. at 509. The test announced in Tinker was first set forth in the Fifth Circuit case
of Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). In Burnside high school students brought
an action against school officials for denying their right to wear "freedom buttons." Id. at 746.
The court found no evidence of student interference with educational activities, so the court
found the regulation prohibiting the buttons infringed on the students' rights of free expression.
Id. at 748. The Fifth Circuit indicated that school authorities could regulate student speech only
if it "materially and substantially interfere[s] with requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school." Id. at 749.
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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overcome the [students'] right[s] to freedom of expression."23 Since the Tinker
Court found no "facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact
occurred[,]" the2 4 Court determined that the school's restriction was
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court in Tinker strongly believed that students should
possess the same constitutional rights in school as they do outside of school.
The Court acknowledged, "First amendment rights . . . are available to
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."25 The Court further emphasized that school officials should
not be able to control students simply because they are on school property by
stating, "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect .... ."26 The
Court explained that the rule established in Tinker is not confined to the
school classroom, but that students' rights extend to other school activities as
well.27 The Tinker decision demonstrated that the Court highly valued the First
Amendment rights of students and believed that they should not be lightly
denied.
Both Barnette and Tinker strongly suggest that students' First
Amendment rights should be highly protected. For approximately twenty years
following the decision of Tinker, courts continued to afford great First
Amendment protections to students of all ages. Courts used the test defined

23.
24.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 514.

25. Id. at 506. In two earlier cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged that students and
teachers possess constitutional rights while in school. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), the Supreme Court found that statutes
forbidding teaching foreign language to young students unconstitutionally interfered with the
liberty of teachers and students.
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
27. Id. at 512-13. The Supreme Court explained:
A student's rights, therefore do not embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions... if he does
so without 'materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and
without colliding with the rights of others.
Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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in Tinker to prohibit school authorities from inhibiting students' free speech

rights in many cases involving elementary and high school students.2"

C. BOARD OFEDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
29
PtCO

In 1982, in Board of Education,Island Trees Union Free School District
v. Pico, the Supreme Court prohibited school officials from removing books
from library shelves by relying on Tinker and Barnette.30 The Court in Pico
stated that the rule which evolved from Tinker and Barnette was that

"discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education must
be exercised in a manner that comports with transcendent imperatives of the

First Amendment."'" The Court concluded that students' First Amendment
rights were violated when school officials removed books from the library

because students have a "right to receive information and ideas."32
D. HEALY V. JAME&'

3

The Supreme Court also applied the Tinker test to cases in college and
university settings to strike down regulations that allowed school officials to
have too much authority over student expression and association. In 1972, the
United States Supreme Court in Healy v. James applied the "material and

28. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976)
(holding that First Amendment rights of students were violated when school board removed
books from library shelves); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (striking
down a rule prohibiting distribution on school premises of publications not approved by
superintendent); Gambino v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff 'd
per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) (ruling that school board's suppression of proposed
sex education article in school newspaper violated First Amendment rights of students); Bayer
v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (prohibiting
principal's seizure and refusal to allow distribution ofnewspaper and sex education supplement
as an unconstitutional abridgement of students' First Amendment rights).
29. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
30. Id. at 865. The nine books removed by the school board were: Slaughter House
Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets,
by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories ofNegro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice,
by an anonymous author; Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; A
HeroAin't Nothin'But a Sandwich, by Alice Childress; and Soul On Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver.
Id. at 856 n.3.
31. Id. at864.
32. Id. at 867; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (explaining that freedom of speech and press
necessarily protects the right to receive).
33. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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substantial disruption" standard of Tinker to a controversial decision by
college authorities to not officially recognize a particular student group.34 The
Court concluded that a public college or university could not refuse to
recognize an organization simply because university officials had an undocumented fear of school disruption.35 The Supreme Court announced in Healy
that First Amendment protections should apply with equal force on college
campuses and the community at large.3"
3
"
E. PAPISH V. BOARD OF CURATORS

The Supreme Court also relied on Tinker in upholding rights of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press for college and university students.38 In
Papish v. Board of Curators,the Supreme Court applied the Tinker test to
show that the University of Missouri violated a student's First Amendment
rights by expelling the student for distributing an offensive newspaper on
campus. 39 The Court reaffirmed that colleges and universities must respect
students' First Amendment rights.' While the Court stated that school

34. Id. at 189. In applying the Tinker standard the Healy Court stated, "Associational
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes
or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id. The
plaintiffs in Healy were students attending Central Connecticut State College, which was a statesupported institution of higher learning. Id. at 172. The organization seeking official campus
recognition was a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"), an organization
associated with campus unrest at other universities in 1969-1970. Id. at 170.
35. Id. at 169-71. The Court determined that school officials' fear of disruption was
unfounded because SDS representatives said they would operate "completely independent" from
the national Students for a Democratic Society, and the Student Affairs Committee approved
recognition for the group, not finding they would be disruptive. Id. at 172-73. Recognition was
necessary for the organization to be able to use campus facilities for meetings and to use campus
bulletin boards and the campus newspaper. Id. at 176. Members who attempted to meet at a
coffee shop on school property were forced to leave by a school official. Id.
36. Id. at 180. The Court acknowledged that, "colleges and universities are not enclaves
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment." Id.
37. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
38. Id. at 670.
39. Id. at 667. The front cover of the newspaper contained a political cartoon that
depicted policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice, and an article with
a headline announcing "M---f-----.Acquitter," which discussed the trial and acquittal of a New
fYork City youth who was a member of an organization known as "Up Against the Wall M ----..... "Id. at 667-68. The Supreme Court found that distributing the newspaper did not cause any
disruption nor did it interfere with the rights of other students. Id. at 670 n.6. The Court agreed
with the Court of Appeals finding that "no disruption of the University's functions occurred in
connection with the distribution." Id. (quoting Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 464 F.2d 136, 139-'40
(8th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)).
40. Id. at 670 -71. The Court explained, "the First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech
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officials should have authority over the time, place and manner of speech in

its dissemination, the Court showed great disfavor for school officials placing
restrictions on the content of student speech. 4 ' The Supreme Court explained,
"the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on
a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
'conventions of decency.' 4 2
In the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court showed a great deal of
deference toward the rights of students and required school officials to show
extremely persuasive reasons for limiting those rights. However, the Court
began to move in a different direction beginning in the mid-1980s, restricting
the rights of students in several cases.
II. RESTRICTING STUDENTS' RIGHTS: FRASER AND HAZELWOOD
A. BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

403 v. FRASERe 3

The first major deviation from the standards set in Barnette and Tinker
came in 1986 in the Supreme Court decision of Bethel School DistrictNo. 403
v. Fraser. Matthew Fraser was a high school student who delivered a
nominating speech for a fellow classmate at a school-sponsored assembly."
Throughout his speech, Fraser used crude, sexual innuendos to express
himself.4 As a result of his speech, school officials suspended Fraser from

...
" Id. at 671. The Court also reaffirmed that "'state colleges and universities are not enclaves
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment."' Id. at 670 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 180 (1972)).
41. Id. at 670. The Court held that expelling students and refusing to distribute material
based on its content was a violation of students' First Amendment rights. Id.
42. Papish, 410 U.S. at 670. The Court went on to explain that Supreme Court
precedents made it clear that the cartoon and the story published in this newspaper were not
constitutionally obscene, therefore, the publication was constitutionally protected speech. Id.
43.
43. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
44. Id. at 677. Students were required to attend the assembly or report to study hall. Id.
Approximately six hundred students attended the assembly. Id.
45. Id. at 678. The speech included the following statements:
I know a man who is firm- he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm... Jeff Kulhman is a man who takes his point and
pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally - he succeeds... Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even
the climax for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vicepresident - he'll never come between you and the best our high school
can be.
Id. at 687.
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school for three days and removed his name from the list of candidates for
graduation speaker.' The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, upheld the
school's disciplinary actions against Fraser."
In upholding the school's action, the Court did not apply the "material
and substantial disruption" test from Tinker because the Court found that
Fraser was distinguishable in several ways. First, the Court explained that
Tinker involved the advocation of a political viewpoint that did not contradict
an educational mission of the school, while Fraser's speech interfered with the
school's mission of inculcating "habits and manners of civility."48 Second, the
armbands worn in Tinker were passive and nonintrusive, while Fraser's
speech was active and offensive to some students.49 Third, the court found a
"marked distinction" between the obscene sexual content of Fraser's speech
and the students' conveyance of a political message through armbands.' The
Supreme Court did not find Fraser's speech worthy of much constitutional
protection because of its lewd nature, and, therefore, the Supreme Court gave
great deference to the school's decision to punish Matthew Fraser.51
Justice Burger, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Fraser,
announced that students possess limited rights of free speech. The Court
explained that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
52
automatically co-extensive with the rights of adults in other settings." The
46. Id. at 678. The district court, however, enjoined the school district from preventing
Fraser from speaking at graduation, and he did deliver the commencement speech after being
elected graduation speaker by a write-in vote of his classmates. Id. at 679.
47. Id. at 685.
48. Fraser,478 U.S. at 680-81.
49. Id. at 680. A school counselor reported that some students appeared to be
embarrassed by the speech. Id. at 678.
50. Id. at 680.
51. Id. at 685 ("We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within its
permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and
indecent speech."). The Court explained, "Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse." Id. at
683.
52. Id. at 682 ("It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive
form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school."). To support its
contention that children in public schools have less rights than adults, the Court cited New
Jersey v. T.L 0., 469 U.S. 325,340 (1985), where the Court held that no warrants are required
for school officials to search students because the school setting requires easing of restrictions
that public authorities are normally subject to. Limitations on student speech have been found
to be especially appropriate where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience includes
children. For example, in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court
upheld a New York statute banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even though
the material was entitled to First Amendment protection for adults. Also, in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,438 U.S. 726,732 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a radio station did not have
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Court also gave broad power to school boards to prohibit student activity that
they do not find appropriate. The Court anounced, "The determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate
properly rests with the school board." 3
B. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER54

Just two years later in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the
Supreme Court showed how far it was willing to go in giving deference to
school authorities at the expense of students' rights. Hazelwood involved the
rights of school authorities to censor a school-sponsored newspaper. The
school newspaper, Spectrum, was produced in an advanced journalism class
at Hazelwood East High School. 5 Before publication of each issue, the
journalism teacher submitted proofs to the school principal for him to
review. 6 In the issue in question, the principal found two articles
objectionable, one dealing with students' experiences with pregnancy and a
second discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. 7 The
principal deleted the two pages of the newspaper which included the offending
articles.5" Three students who were editors of the newspaper sued, and the
case concluded in the United States Supreme Court where the principal's
actions were upheld in a 6-3 decision. 9
Once again the Supreme Court refused to apply the Tinker "material and
substantial disruption" test by explaining that the case was distinguishable
from Tinker. The Court explained that the students in Tinker were different
than the students in Hazelwood because a dichotomy exists between student
expression that merely takes place on school property and expressions that are

a First Amendment right to broadcast sexually explicit material especially "when children were

undoubtedly in the audience."
53. Fraser,478 U.S. at 683 ("The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine
that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused
boy.").
54.

484 U.S. 260 (1988).

55. Id. at 262. Spectrum was published every three weeks or so during the 1982-1983
school year. Id. More than 4,500 copies of the newspaper were distributed during the year to
students, school employees and members of the community. Id.
56. Id. at 263.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 264. The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles on
teenage marriage, runaways and juvenile delinquents, as well as the articles on divorce and
teenage pregnancy. Id. at n. 1. The principal testified that he had no objection to these articles,
but that they were only deleted because they appeared on the same pages as the objectionable
articles. Id.
59. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260, 262.
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sponsored by the school.' The Court reasoned that when speech is sponsored
by the school, a different standard should apply. The Court announced that
when school-sponsored speech is concerned, school officials may censor such
speech, as long as "their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."' In applying this standard, the Court concluded that
the school principal did act reasonably in deleting the articles because he did
not think the articles were appropriate journalistic pieces for a high school
audience.62
The decision in Hazelwood announced that a new test should be applied
to students' speech rights when a student engages in any activities that are
school-sponsored. The Court's definition of school-sponsored activities is
broadly defined as all activities that might "fairly be characterized as part of
the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences."63
The Hazelwood test reduced the free speech rights that students had
enjoyed since Tinker because the new test afforded great deference to school
officials and announced that judicial intervention would be kept to a minimum
in student speech cases. According to the Hazelwood majority, only when
censorship has "no valid educational purpose" should a court become involved
and act to protect students' rights." The Court went on to describe just how
broad this new standard was in allowing censorship by giving examples of
material that is censorable: material that is "ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased orprejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable
for immature audiences," or anything "inconsistent with 'shared values of a
civilized social order. "65

60. Id. at 270-71.
61. Id. at 273.
62. Id. at 274-75. The Court determined the principal's actions were reasonable because
he could have reasonably been concerned that students' anonymity was not adequately protected
in the teen pregnancy article because of the small number of pregnant students in the school. Id.

at 274. The Court also thought that the principal could have been concerned that the teen

pregnancy article did not protect the privacy of the students' boyfriends or parents discussed in

the article. Id. The Court discussed that the principal may also have worried that the frank sexual
details in that article could have been inappropriate for some of the younger students. Id. at 274-

75. The Court also found that the principal could have reasonably concluded that the article
about divorce was inappropriate because one of the students criticized his father, who was not

given an opportunity to defend himself. Id at 275.
63. Id.at 271.
64. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.

65.. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
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In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, disputed the majority's findings. Justice Brennan argued that the
distinction between Hazelwood and Tinker explained by the majority was
artificial and without case support.6 Brennan pointed out that the Court in
Tinker never suggested that the test created in that case should only be applied
when the speech in question is personal in nature and not when speech is
school-sponsored. 67 The dissent believed that the majority abandoned Tinker
in order to give educators "greater control" over school-sponsored speech than
the Tinker test would permit. 6
The dissent criticized the Court for offering "an obscure tangle of three
excuses" to justify its decision: the public educator's prerogative to control
curriculum; the pedagogical interest in shielding students from objectionable
viewpoints and sensitive topics; and the school's need to disassociate itself
from student expression.69 The dissent found that none of the excuses justified
the distinction that the majority drew between Hazelwood and Tinker.70 The
dissent noted that the first excuse, the public educator's prerogative to control
the curriculum, was completely addressed by Tinker; therefore, it was
inappropriate for the Court to create a new standard to address it.7 The second
excuse, the pedagogical interest in shielding high school audiences from
objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics, was illegitimate according to
the dissent because educators are forbidden to act as "thought police,"
according to Tinker.72 Finally, the dissent noted that the third excuse, the
school's desire to disassociate itself from student expression, could have been
achieved in a less intrusive way,,such as publishing a disclaimer." Since the
66. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Papish v. Bd.of Curators,410 U.S. 667,
671 (1973) and Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 189, 191 (1972), where the Supreme Court

found acts of school officials unconstitutional without distinguishing between school-sponsored

and incidental student expression.
67. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Tinkerdidnot even hint that
the personal nature was of any (much less dispositive) relevance.").

68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 282-83.
70. Id. at 283 ("Tinker fully addresses the first concern; the second is illegitimate; and

the third is readily achievable through less oppressive means.").
71. Id. The dissent thought the "material disruption" test should be applied to all

activities in the school environment whether they were school-sponsored or not. Id. The dissent

noted, "After all, this Court applied the same standard whether the students in Tinker wore their

armbands to the 'classroom' or the 'cafeteria."' Id See supra note 27.

72. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 285. The dissent's position found support in Tinker, where
the Court announced, "[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed circuit recipients of only that

which the state chooses to communicate." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
73. 484 U.S. at 289. The dissent cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), in
support of its position that the school could have disassociated itself from the speech in a less
restrictive way. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 289. In Shelton, the Supreme Court explained, "Even
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dissent did not see any reason to distinguish Hazelwood from Tinker, those
justices would have applied the "material and substantial disruption" test to
the newspaper articles and would have struck down the principal's actions of
censoring the articles because the dissenting justices found that the articles
were not "materially and substantially disruptive." '
Since the United States Supreme Court passed down the decisions in
Fraserand Hazelwood, United States district courts and circuit courts have
followed the Supreme Court's lead and continued to restrict the First
Amendment rights of students. Many courts have upheld school regulations
at the expense of students' First Amendment rights.

m.

THE EFFECTS OF HAZELWOOD AND FRASER

A. POLING V. MURPHY 75

Poling v. Murphy is one of the first cases following the Supreme Court's
decision in Hazelwood where a federal court upheld local school officials'
restrictions on student expression. In Poling, school authorities disqualified
Dean Poling, a high school student, from candidacy for student council
president after he delivered a speech criticizing school authorities at a schoolsponsored assembly.76 The principal found Poling's speech to be
"inappropriate, disruptive to school discipline, and in bad taste."" Dean
Poling sued, and the Sixth Circuit held that school authorities acted within
their limits by disciplining Poling.78
In upholding the actions of the school authorities, the Sixth Circuit
applied the lenient standard of scrutiny established in Fraserand Hazelwood
and deferred to the judgment of the school authorities."9 In doing so, the court
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."

364 U.S. at 488.
74.

484 U.S. at 289.

75. 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
76. Id.at 759. In his speech, Dean Poling said:
The administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't notice. For
example, why does (Assistant Principal] Davidson stutter while he is on the intercom? He
doesn't have a speech impediment. If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for me
for president. I can try to bring back student rights that you have missed and maybe get things

that you have always wanted. All you have to is vote for me, Dean Poling.
Id.

77. Id. Although students jumped up, clapped their hands and yelled things like "way
to go, Dean" at Poling's reference to the assistant principal, these actions did not go "above or

beyond that present for any of the other candidates," according to those present. Id.
78.
79.

Id. at 758.
Id. at 761.
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first determined that the election assembly was a school-sponsored activity."
Then, the court applied the Hazelwood test, and found that "shared values of
a civilized order," namely discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority fall
within the universe of "legitimate pedagogical concerns."8 ' Since school
officials explained that their actions were related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns, they were within their rights to punish Poling for his criticism of the
school's administration. 2
The court in Poling never actually examined the appropriateness of the
school authorities' disciplinary actions but instead followed the precedent set
by Fraserand Hazelwood and deferred to the school authorities. The Sixth
Circuit emphasized the concept of judicial deference to school authorities by
expressing that courts should almost never become involved in such matters.
The court stated that determining the most appropriate course of conduct was
a decision that "represents a judgment call best left to the locally-elected
school board, not to a distant, life-tenured judiciary." 3 The court emphasized
that "local school officials ... must obviously be accorded wide latitude in
choosing which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in choosing the means
through which those values are to be promoted." 4 The court also emphasized
that students have limited rights by stating that "limitations on speech that
would be unconstitutional outside the schoolhouse are not necessarily
unconstitutional within it.'"'

80. Poling, 872 F.2d at 762. School officials scheduled the assembly to be held on
school property during school hours, and attendance was compulsory for all. id.

81.

Id. ("The universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to

the academic."). The court found support from Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,478
U.S. 675,683 (1986), where the Supreme Court explained that "schools must teach by example
the shared values of a civilized social order."

82. 872 F.2d at 763. The administrators found Dean Poling's comment in bad taste, and
the court thought it was not irrational for the school authorities to take offense at a remark used
to gain Dean Poling votes at the expense of the assistant principal's dignity. Id.
83. Id. at 761. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Fraser,478 U.S. 675,683
(1986), where the Court announced, "The determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board."
84.

Poling, 872 F.2d at 762. The court cited to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,741-

42 (1974), for the proposition that local control over public schools is a deeply rooted tradition.
Poling, 872 F.2d at 762-63.
85. 872 F.2d at 762. The court found support from Justice Black's dissent in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where Black said
that the Federal Constitution does not require "teachers, parents and elected school officials to
surrender control of the American public school system to public school students." Id. at 526
(Black, J., dissenting).
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B. VIRGIL V. SCHOOL BOARD 86

The Eleventh Circuit also applied the Hazelwood test in Virgil v. School
Board.8 ' The Eleventh Circuit permitted a school board to remove textbooks
from the curriculum that the board deemed sexually explicit and vulgar, based
on a "legitimate pedagogical concern.""8 Even though the court disagreed that
high school students would be harmed by "masterpieces of western literature"
such as Lysistrata by Aristophanes and The Miller's Tale by Chaucer, the
court concluded that Hazelwoodprovided school officials with legal authority
for their actions of removing the books.8 9 While the court believed the school
board's decision to remove the books reflected its own restrictive view, the
court applied the deferential standard recently established in Hazelwood to
uphold the board's actions.'
C. BULL V. DARDANELLE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1591

Other courts following the lead of Poling have shown that school
authorities are given broad discretion to censor expression by merely
announcing that the student speech or expression conflicts with "legitimate
pedagogical concerns." In 1990, in Bull v. DardanellePublic School District
No. 15, an Arkansas federal district court upheld a school's rejection of a
student's candidacy for student council officer.' The student claimed the
teachers disapproved of his candidacy because of his outspoken attitudes, but
the court concluded that the teachers' actions were appropriate because they
were not taken to retaliate but to foster the objectives of the student council.93
86. 862F.2d1517(llthCir. 1989).
87. Id. at 1520-23.
88. Id. at 1518. The school board's motivation for the removal of the books was related
to explicit sexuality and vulgar language in selections of these books. Id. at 1520. The court held
that was a legitimate concern. Id. at 1522-23.
89.

Id. at 1525.

91.

745 F. Supp. 1455 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

90. Id. The court specifically announced that it did not endorse the school board's
decision, but the court explained that its "role is not to second guess the wisdom of the board's
action." Id.
92. Id. at 1462. The student rejected was an honor student with a 3.40 GPA, active in
school activities, and President of the Junior Class. id. He was ineligible to run for student
council because he did not receive approval from two-thirds of his teachers, which was a
requirement to run. Id. He met all of the other requirements to run. Id.
93. Id. at 1460. The court found that if the teacher's actions were based on his
outspoken behavior, then their actions were appropriate because teachers are allowed to teach
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. li at 1461. The court found the teacher's actions
appropriate by relying on Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), where
the Court held that one objective of schools is the"inculcat[ion of) fundamental values necessary
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The court stated that allowing teachers to approve the candidates was related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns because schools have an important role in
teacher-shared values.'
SCHOOL CORP. 95 AND MULLER V. JEFFERSON
D. BAXTER V. VIGO COUNTY
96
SCHOOL
LIGHTHOUSE

Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Fraser and Hazelwood,
federal circuit courts have continued to limit the applicability of the Tinker
standard to students in a variety of school settings. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals limited the rights of elementary students in a dramatic way by
holding in two separate cases that Tinker does not apply to public elementary
school students.97 In 1994, in Baxterv. Vigo County School Corp., the Seventh
Circuit concluded that school officials could prohibit an elementary school
student from wearing expressive t-shirts. 9s The court found that the student did
not show that she had a clearly established First Amendment right to wear the
t-shirts. 9 School officials did not argue that the t-shirt caused disruption in

determining that the student had no clearly established right, but instead

argued that Tinker was inapplicable because it involved older students. " The
court relied on the decisions of Fraserand Hazelwood to determine that the

to the maintenance of a democratic political system." Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
94. 745 F. Supp. at 1460.
95. 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994).
96. 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996).
97. See Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737-738 (7th Cir. 1994);
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996).
98. 26 F.3d at 730. Chelsie Baxter, a student at Lost Creek Elementary School, and her
parents attempted to complain and object about grades, racism and school policies. Id. In
response to her negative feelings toward the school, Chelsie wore t-shirts that read, "unfair
grades," "racism," and "I hate Lost Creek." Id.
99. Id. at 738. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that Mr. Azar, the principal of Lost
Creek Elementary School, violated Chelsie's rights to free speech. Id. at 730. The Baxters bore
the burden of showing that Chelsie enjoyed a clearly established right to wear her expressive
t-shirts in school. Id. at 737. The court concluded that since the Baxters failed to show that
Chelsie's First Amendment right was clearly established, Mr. Azar was entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 738. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 737 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
100. 26 F.3d at 737. The court explained that the plaintiffs in Tinker were two high
school students and one junior high student, aged 13. Id. The court acknowledged that Chelsie
was only an elementary school student when her attempts at self expression were denied, so she
was at least several years younger than the youngest student in Tinker. Id. at 738.
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Tinker standard should not be applied.'°' The court concluded that "given the
indication in Fraserand Hazelwood that age is a relevant factor in assessing
the extent of a student's free speech rights in school," the First Amendment
rights of elementary students are not "clearly established.' 0 2
In 1996, in Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals once again held that the Tinker standard should not apply to
elementary school students. 3 In Muller, the court concluded that school
officials could prohibit a fourth-grader from distributing invitations to a
religious meeting on school property." The court emphasized that age is a
critical factor in student speech cases because schools should be able to shield
youngsters from "topics and viewpoints that could harm their moral, social
101. Id. at 737-38.
102. Id. at 738. Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in
Fraserfocused primarily on the sexual nature of the speech, the court also found that the Court
considered the age of the speaker and those in the audience. Id. The Court in Fraser,478 U.S.
at 682, explained, "It does not follow ... that simply because the use of an offensive form of
expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point,
the same latitude must be permitted to children in public school." The Seventh Circuit decision
was also supported by Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988),
where the Court explained that "a school must be able to take into account the emotional
maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on
potentially sensitive topics ......
103. 98 F.3d at 1538. The court explained:
The Supreme Court has not expressly considered whether the free
expression rights first announced in Tinker extend to grade school
children. Tinker and its progeny dealt principally with older children for
whom adulthood and full citizenship were fast approaching. The court has
not suggested that fourth-graders have the free expression rights of high
school students.
Id. at 1538. The court therefore concluded that, "it is unlikely that Tinker and its progeny apply
to public elementary students." Id. at 1539. The court noted that no appellate court decisions
have applied First Amendment rights to children inthe elementary school setting. Id. However,
in Hedses v. Wauconda Community School DisrictNo. 118,9 F.3d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993),
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the religious speech rights ofjunior high students noting that
"nothing in the first amendment postpones the right of religious speech until high school."
Federal district courts have held that elementary school students do have free speech rights. For
example, in Johnston-Loehnerv. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575, 581 (M.D.Fla.1994), a district
court found the policy of an elementary school requiring students to obtain prior approval of
school officials before distributing written material violated free speech rights of students, and
in Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District,827 F. Supp. 1459, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1993), a
district court held that a dress code violated free speech rights of elementary school students.
104. 98 F.3d at 1538. Andrew Muller, a fourth grade student, sought permission to hand
out invitations to a meeting of a group called AWANA ("Approved Workmen Are Not
Ashamed") being held at his church. Id. at 1532. AWANA members meet throughout the
country for small group Bible studies and Christian fellowship. Id. The Mullers considered the
distribution of the invitations an "effort to evangelize for the Gospel of Jesus Christ" and "an
exercise of sincerely-held beliefs." Id. According to the Mullers, Andrew sought to distribute
the invitations only during non-instructional times. Id.
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and intellectual development."'0 5 Because the court found the Tinker standard
inapplicable in this case, it applied the Hazelwood test and said that the
restrictions only had to be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."' ' 6 The court found that the school code, which did not allow certain
material to be distributed during school hours, was a reasonable tool for
ensuring that student-distributed publications do not interfere with the
school's educational mission.'0 7

105. Id. at 1538. The Supreme Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,478
U.S. 675, 683 (1986) agreed that age was an important factor, noting the vulnerability of a "less
mature audience" (many "only 14 years old") to offensive speech. The Supreme Court in
HazelwoodSchool Districtv. Kuhlmeier,484 U.S. 260,272 (1988) also thought that age should
be a consideration by allowing school officials to take into account the emotional maturity of
the intended audience.
106. 98 F.3d at 1545 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
107. Id. The complaint alleged that Sections 6144.11 and 6144.12 of the Racine Unified
School District Code of Student Responsibilities and Rights (1994-1995) violated students'
First Amendment rights. Id. Section 6144.11 stated in part:
Non-School-Sponsored Publications
Publications produced by school district students without school
sponsorship, or handbills may be distributed and/or sold within the school
according to the following procedure.
1. They must include the name of the sponsoring organization and/or
individual.
2. A time and place for the distribution must be set cooperatively with the
principal.
3. A copy must be given to the principal at least 24 hours before its
distribution.
4. The publication shall contain this phrase: "The opinions expressed are
not necessarily those of the school district or its personnel."
5. If the principal finds the publication (1) contains libelous or obscene
language, (2) may incite persons to illegal acts, (3) is insulting to any
group or individuals, or (4) he/she can reasonably forecast that its
distribution to the students will greatly disrupt or materially interfere with
school procedures and intrude into school affairs or the lives of others,
the principal shall notify the sponsors of the publication that its
distribution may not be started or must stop. The principal shall state the
reason for his/her decision.
Muller, 98 F.3d at 1534 n.2. The District Court held that provision 4, requiring that a handout
contain a statement disclaiming school endorsement, violated the constitutional rights of the
students because it was an unreasonable "regulation of the content of pure speech," but the
Appellate Court reversed that decision. Id. at 1545.
Section 6144.12 states: Distribution and Displaying Materials - The written permission of the
school principal or the Superintendent of Schools is required before students may distribute or
display on designated bulletin boards, material from sources outside the school. 98 F.3d at 1534
n.3.
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E. KINCAID V. GIBSON1

On September 8, 1999, in a decision that has since been vacated' °9 and

reversed," 0 an appellate court restricted student rights by applying the lenient
Hazelwood standard to college students."' Although the decision has recently
been reversed upon en banc review, the original decision of the Sixth Circuit
is instructive in demonstrating how courts are applying Hazelwood to all
students (even those who are adults).." 2
The Sixth Circuit, in Kincaid v. Gibson, applied the Hazelwood standard
to a university publication even though the Supreme Court in Hazelwood
expressly did not decide what standard should be applied to colleges and
universities.11 3 In Kincaid,two Kentucky State University ("KSU") students
challenged a ban of the University's 1992-1994 yearbook, The Thorobred,
claiming that a school official's refusal to distribute the yearbook violated
their First Amendment rights to free speech and expression." 4 The VicePresident for Student Affairs decided to ban the book because she was
15
displeased with its contents.1

108. 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, No. 98-5385, 2001 WL 10600 (6th
Cir. Jan. 5, 2001).
109. 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999).
110. No. 98-5385, 2001 WL 10600 (6th Cit. Jan. 5, 2001) (en banc).
!11.
191 F.3d at 726-29.
112. In his dissent in the earlier Sixth Circuit decision of Kincaid v. Gibson, Circuit
Judge Cole expressed his belief that college and university students should receive greater

deference than high school students. Id. at 730 n. 1. He explained, "While it may be a stretch to
consider college-aged students full adults, a school's concern for the 'emotional maturity of the
intended audience,' is certainly less pressing for college students than for high school students."
Id. (citations omitted).
113.

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Court

explained, "We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level." Id. at 273
n.7.
114. 191 F.3d at 722. The plaintiffs were Charles Kincaid, a student at KSU who
purchased the yearbook at issue, and Capri Coffer, a KSU student who was editor of the
yearbook. Id. The school official responsible for banning the books was Betty Gibson, who was
Vice-President for Student Affairs. Id. at 723. After consulting with the University President,
Gibson instructed the Director of Student Life to secure all of the yearbooks and planned to later
discard them. Id.
115. Id. Ms. Gibson was specifically
disturbed by the yearbook's purple cover, its vague theme and title
'Destination Unknown,' the inclusion of pictures and public figures
unrelated to KSU such as Ross Perot, Bill Clinton, and the Pope, the
paucity of pictures of school figures and events, and the fact that many of
the pictures lacked captions.
Id. Capri Coffer, the editor of the yearbook, structured the book around the theme "Kentucky
State: Destination Unknown" because in her words,
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The appellate court noted that courts have afforded substantial First
Amendment protections to college students when school officials have
attempted to censor college publications." 6 However, the court went on to

7
explain that broad First Amendment protections are not without limit." The

court cited Hazelwood and concluded that The Thorobred was school-

sponsored despite the fact that the publication was not a product of the

classroom, like the school newspaper in Hazelwood.Since The Thorobredwas
school-sponsored, it could be regulated in any reasonable manner. "' The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the school official's confiscation of The Thorobredwas
reasonable because the yearbook "fail[ed] to accomplish its intended
purpose."" 9 Although the court noted that the school officials may have acted
it was a commentary [on] just about everything that was happening at the
University and within the lives of the students ....It was about...
saying where are we going in our lives... Destination Unknown, where
am I going to be in five years from now[?] Where am I going to be ten
years from now[?]
Id. Coffer explained that she chose to include photographs that depicted current events in the
community and around the world, rather than just photos from KSU. Id. Finally, Coffer
explained that she chose a purple cover for the yearbook rather than the university colors ofgold
and green because she explained, "We want[ed] to do something different. We wanted to bring
Kentucky State University into the nineties... I wanted to present a yearbook to the student
population that was what they ha[d] never seen before." Id. This was not the first time the
yearbook had used non-university colors. Id.
116. Id. at 726. For examples of cases where courts have struck down regulations that
censor college publications, see Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting
a university from cutting the student newspaper's funding because the university disapproved
of its content); Schiffv. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a university could
not dismiss student newspaper editors because the university disapproved of the paper's
editorial content); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1973) (finding that a university
withdrawing funds from the student newspaper violated students' rights to freedom of
expression); Bazaar v. Fortune,476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) (explaining that students' rights
to free speech were violated when a university censored a student literary publication); Antonelli
v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) (striking down a requirement that all material
to be published be reviewed by university administrators); and Kom v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138
(D. Md. 1970) (concluding that a university's deletion of material from a student publication
violated students' First Amendment rights).
117. 191F.3dat726.
118. Id. at 727-29. The yearbook was school-sponsored because it was operated on KSU
property and funded by the university. Id. at 722. The court also noted that the newspaper was
subject to oversight by the Student Publications Board, which was made up of the editors of the
school publications, such as the newspaper and yearbook, along with the Vice-President for
Student Affairs, and the Student Publications Coordinator. Id. The board's functions included
"selecting editors and staff for the student publications, arranging seminars for journalism
education, providing the publications with counsel, and approving the written publications
policy of each student publication, including such items as purpose, size, quantity controls, and
time, place, and manner of distribution." Id.
119. Id. at 728-29. The court found that it was reasonable for KSU to "seek to maintain
its image to potential students, alumni and the general public." Id. at 729. Further, the court
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in a more reasonable manner by monitoring the yearbook's creation rather
the Sixth Circuit upheld the school officials'
than banning the final product,
120
publication.
censoring of the
On September 29, 1999, before the decision of Kincaid v. Gibson was
reversed, the Sixth Circuit opinion was vacated and the 1997 district court
opinion stood until the en banc rehearing took place.121 In the district court
decision, the United States district court judge also relied on Hazelwood to
determine that the actions of the college administrators in banning the
yearbook were "reasonable."' 122 He noted that based on Hazelwood, "A school
must be able to set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated
under its auspices - standards that may be higher than those demanded by
some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the 'real' world - and
may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those
standards.' 23 Because the judge determined that it was reasonable for the
school officials to want the yearbook to focus mainly on KSU instead of
24
current events, the district court judge upheld the school officials' actions.
On January 5, 2001 the Sixth Circuit, hitting en banc, found, in a 10-3
decision, that the previous courts hearing Kincaidinappropriately applied the
Hazelwood standard to a college publication.'25 The Sixth Circuit further
concluded that university officials' actions in confiscating the yearbook were
arbitrary and unreasonable. 26 By acting in such a manner, university officials
violated students' First Amendment rights. 127 As a result, the court reversed
the previous decisions of Kincaid28and remanded the case to the trial court to
determine the appropriate relief.
Even though the Sixth Circuit panel decision and district court decision
have been reversed by an en banc review, the case may not yet be over
because Kentucky State University can still appeal to the United States
concluded that it was reasonable for KSU to "cut its losses by refusing to distribute a university
publication that might tarnish, rather than enhance, that image." Id.

120. Id. at 729. The court explained that regulation of speech in such a case "need only
be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."(quoting
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992)).
121. See Whitney Carnahan, Court Votes to Re-Hear College Censorship Case,
(DeKalb, IlI.), Dec. 3, 1999, at 1.
No. 95-98, slip op. at 14 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14,1997).
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122.

123. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988)).
124. Id.
125. No. 98-5385, 2001 WL 10600, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2001).
126. Id. at * 11. The court explained: "[The] confiscation of the yearbook was anything
but reasonable; rather, it was a rash, arbitrary act, wholly out of proportion to the situation it was
allegedly intended to address." Id.
127. Id. at*1, 11.
128. Id.
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Supreme Court.'29 If the university does so, it will be interesting to see how
the Supreme Court evaluates the case in light of the district court and Sixth
Circuit panel decisions as well as the en banc review of Kincaid v. Gibson.
As is demonstrated by many of the previously described cases, many
federal courts following Fraserand Hazelwood (with the exception of the
recent Sixth Circuit en banc review of Kincaid) have continued to close the
schoolhouse gate on students' free speech rights. One major tool that has been
used by courts to justify doing so is the increased amount of deference and
discretion given to school officials, so that regulations now only have to be
reasonable.13 The public forum doctrine is another tool that federal courts
have widely employed 3to decrease students' free speech rights following
Fraserand Hazelwood.' 1
IV. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The public forum doctrine was created by the Supreme Court "to address
the recurring and troublesome issue of when the First Amendment gives an
individual or group the right to engage in expressive activity on government
property."' 32 Supreme Court Justice Douglas announced, "[T]he Court has
recognized that the person's right to speak and the interests that such speech
serves for society as a whole must be balanced against the 'other interests
inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put."'33 The
Court found that the best way to balance these interests was to divide public
places into categories and define rights of free speech according to the
category of the public property.
A. TYPES OF FORUMS

In 1983, the United States Supreme Court identified three different types
forums
that can be created by the government in PerryEducationalAss'n
of
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 34 The Court also explained how much

129. Whitney Carnahan & Erica Fatland, A Win for College Media, NORTHERN STAR
Jan.18, 2001 at 1, 6.
(DeKalb, 111.),
130. See supra Parts II.A-B, III.A-E.
131. See infra Part V.D.
132. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,815
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 816 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
134. 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
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control the government has over restricting speech in each of these types of
forums.' 35
36
The first forum identified in Perry is the traditional public forum.
Traditional public forums are places that by historical tradition or by
government mandate have been devoted to assembly and debate.' 37 In the
traditional public forum, the rights of the state and federal government to limit
speech and expressive activity are narrowly drawn.'38 In order for a contentbased government restriction on speech to be allowed in a traditional public
forum, the restriction must be necessary to achieve a compelling-state interest
and be narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose to withstand strict
constitutional scrutiny. 3 9 The state may enforce regulations of the time, place,
and manner of expression that are content-neutral, but only if the regulations
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. "0
The second type of forum identified in Perryis the limited or designated
public forum. 4 ' A limited public forum is property that the state has opened
for use by the public for a limited purpose or limited purposes. 4 2 Even though
the government is not required to create such a forum, as long as it does, the
government is bound by the same standards as those applied to the traditional
public forum.'43 "Reasonable time, place and manner restrictions are
permissible, but content-based restrictions must be narrowly drawn to
effectuate a compelling state interest."' 44
In 1985, the Supreme Court specifically explained how a limited or
designated public forum could be created by the government in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and EducationalFund, Inc.' 45 The Court explained,

135.

Id.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.

144.

Id.

136. id. at 45.
137. Id. Examples of traditional public forums are streets and parks, which "have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
138. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
139. Id.
142. Id. at 45-46. The Court explained, "A public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups." Id. at 46, n.7. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (student groups); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Promotions v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater).
143. Perry,460 U.S. at 46.
145.

473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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"The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting

limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for

public discourse."' 46 In order to determine if a limited public forum has been

created, courts must examine "the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to
assembly and debate as a public forum."' 4 7 The court must also examine the
with the expressive activity to
nature of the property and its compatibility
1 48
intent.
determine the government's

Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for

public expression encompasses the third type of forum, which is the nonpublic
forum. 149 In nonpublic forums the government may impose time, place, and
manner regulations." 0 The state may also impose any regulations on speech
as long as they are "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's views."''
B. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE PRIOR TO HAZELWOOD

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood,many courts found
high school and college publications and facilities to be at least limited public
forums.152 For example, in Widmar v. Vincent,"s3 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state university making its facilities generally available to
registered student groups created a limited public forum."'" In Widmar, a
registered student religious group that had previously received permission to
146. Id. at 802.
147. Id.
148. Perry,460 U.S. at 46.
149. Id.; see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 129 (1981) ("[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by the government.").
150. 460 U.S. at 46.
151. Id. The Court in United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 129, explained that "the State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
152. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a
state university newspaper could not reject some advertisements because it was an open forum
to advertisements); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) (requiring all
material to be submitted to advisory board prior to publication in campus newspaper was
unconstitutional because newspaper was a public forum); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266
(D. Colo. 1971) (suspending editor of college newspaper for publishing "controversial" articles
was impermissible since the newspaper was a forum for student expression); Zucker v. Panitz,
299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that school officials could not reject a paid
advertisement in opposition to Vietnam War because high school newspaper was a forum for
the dissemination of ideas).
153. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
154. Id. at 267.

2001]

STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS

conduct meetings at University of Missouri facilities was informed that it
could no longer do so because of a university regulation that prohibited the
use of university buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching." 5' The Court found that through the university's policy of
opening its facilities to student groups, the University of Missouri had created
a limited public forum and therefore was required to justify its regulation by

showing it was narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.'56
The Court concluded that the state interest in the case - achieving
separation of church and State - was not sufficiently "compelling" to justify
the restriction of speech.' 57 The Court not only acknowledged that this
particular university had created a public forum for a limited purpose, but
noted that campuses of public universities in general have many of the
characteristics of public forums.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a student literary magazine

was created as a public forum for student expression in Bazaar v. Fortune.5 9
School officials argued that the magazine in question was a nonpublic forum
because it was published with the advice of the English Department and
received university funds."W The court, however, found that the magazine,
designed for presentation of student-written and student-edited literary
compositions, was a public forum for students, and concluded that the

155. Id. at 265. The stated policy of the University of Missouri was to encourage student
organizations, and it recognized over one hundred student groups and made its facilities
available to those groups. Id. But the university informed Cornerstone, an organization of
evangelical Christian students, that it could no longer meet in its buildings because of the new
university regulation. Id.
156. Id. at 267.
157.

Id. at 276.,

158. Id. at 268 n.5. The Supreme Court recognized that public universities do possess
many of the characteristics of a public forum in Police Department. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). The Court in Widmar cited to Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972), where the Court stated, "The college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas."'
159. 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973).
160. Id. at 572. The magazine in question, Images, was a University chartered and
recognized student publication at the University of Mississippi. Id. Images had published
several issues on an irregular basis since its creation in 1969. Id. at 571. The magazine was
funded in part by the university, receiving a $400.00 grant from the Associated Student Body
Activities fund for the academic year in question. Id. at 571-72. The magazine was closely
connected with a creative writing course that was part of the English Department's curriculum
and taught by the magazine's advisor. Id. at 572. Most of the student writings for publication
in Images were supposed to come from the student work in this creative writing course. Id. The
magazine was not designed for widespread circulation, but production was to be limited to
approximately 500 copies per issue that would be sold primarily to students through the
university bookstore. Id.
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university's decision not to distribute the magazine was impermissible. 6
School officials argued that their actions were justified because any
recognized connection with the publication and the university would endanger
public confidence and goodwill of the university.62 The court explained that
the school officials' concerns were not enough to allow the school officials'
actions. 163 Because the University of Mississippi failed to show any
compelling reasons for refusing to distribute the magazine, the actions of
university officials violated the students' First Amendment rights.'"
A federal district court also found that a high school newspaper was
entitled to First Amendment protection because it was a public forum in
Gambinov. FairfaxCounty School Board. 61The school board argued that the
newspaper in question, The FarmNews, was not a public forum but was an
"'in-house' organ of the school system" because revenues for the newspaper
were allocated by the school board, and the newspaper was written and edited
mainly during school hours."6 The district court disagreed, and found that the
school board could not prohibit the publication of a certain article in the

161. Id. at 580. The Chancellor of the University held up binding and distribution of the
Spring 1972 issue of Images when the superintendent of the University's printing facilities
urged the Chancellor to take a close look at the stories to be published in it. id. at 572. The
Chancellor formed a committee of deans from the various University departments to determine
if the material in the magazine was suitable. Id. This committee determined that the publication
was "inappropriate," so the University refused to finish binding it or allow it to be distributed.
Id. The "inappropriate" materials found in the magazine were two short stories written by a
student that focused on interracial love and black pride. Id. The committee found that the
"earthy" language present in those stories was inappropriate and in bad taste. Id.
162. Id. at 572.
163. Id. at 579. The court explained that
speech cannot be stifled by the state merely because it would perhaps
draw an adverse reaction from the majority of people... To come forth
with such a rule would be to virtually read the First Amendment out of
the Constitution and, thus, cost this nation one of its strongest tenets.
Id.
164. Id. at 578, 580. The court found support in its decision from the federal district
court case of American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va.
1970), where the district court explained "that once a public school makes an activity available
to its students, faculty or even the general public, it must operate the activity in accord with first
amendment principles .... "d at 896.
165. 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Vir. 1977).
166. Id. at 733-34. The Farm News was published in the Hayfield Secondary School,
which was governed by the Fairfax County School Board. Id. at 733. Some staff members of
The FarmNews were enrolled in Journalism and received academic credit for their work on the
newspaper, while others worked on the newspaper as an extra-curricular activity. Id. The
newspaper was written and edited in the school during school hours and at the homes of the staff
members. Id. Revenues of The Farm News were generated from advertising, allocations by the
school board, sales of individual issues and student subscriptions. Id.
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newspaper because The Farm News was a public forum. The court
explained that the state's involvement in providing funding and facilities to
The Farm News did not determine if it was a public forum. 6 Because the
court found that the newspaper was "conceived, established and operated as
a conduit for student expression on a wide variety of topics[,]" The Farm
News was a public forum, and the school board violated the students' First
Amendment rights by trying to regulate its content. 69
C. HAZELWOOD AND THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

Although many courts prior to Hazelwood held that school newspapers
were at least limited public forums, the various courts hearing the Hazelwood
case went back and forth on the issue of whether the high school newspaper
at issue, Spectrum, was a limited public or nonpublic forum. The district court
concluded that the newspaper was a nonpublic forum, 7 " the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the newspaper was "a public
forum for expression of student opinion,"'' and the United States Supreme

167. Id. at 736. The school board had prohibited the publication of an article entitled,
"Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraception." Id. at 733. Pursuant to an agreement
regarding potentially controversial material, the article was submitted to the principal for review.
Id. The principal ordered the students not to publish the article as written. Id. Although the
students were given the option of publishing the article with the objectionable portions removed,
the students insisted that all or none of the article be printed. Id. The principal's decision to
prohibit the article was upheld by the Advisory Board on Student Expression, the Division
Superintendent of the Fairfax County Public Schools, and the school board. Id.
168. Id. at 734. The court explained:
While the state may have a particular proprietary interest in a publication
that legitimately precludes it from being a vehicle for First Amendment
expression, it may not foreclose constitutional scrutiny by mere labeling
(citation omitted). Once a publication is determined to be in substance a
free speech forum, constitutional protections attach and the state may
restrict the content of that instrument only in accordance with First
Amendment dictates.
Id. The court found support in Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass.
1970), where the district court explained, "The state is not necessarily the unrestrained master
of what it creates and fosters."
169. 429 F. Supp. at 735.
170. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (E.D. Mo. 1985),
rev'd. The district court concluded that since the newspaper was a nonpublic forum, school
officials could impose restraints on students' speech as long as their decisions had "a reasonable
basis." Id. at 1466 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
171. Kuhlmeierv. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 795 F.2d 1368,1370(8th Cir. 1986), rev'd,484
U.S. 260 (1988). The appellate court explained that Spectrum was a public forum because the
newspaper was "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." 795 F.2d at
1372. The court then concluded that the public forum status of Spectrum precluded school
officials from censoring its contents except when "necessary to avoid material and substantial
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Court reversed in a 6-3 decision and concluded that Spectrum was a nonpublic
1 72

forum.

The Supreme Court began its public forum analysis by explaining that
public schools are unlike traditional public forums because they do not
possess the attributes of streets, parks and other public forums that "time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions."' 7 3 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, school facilities may only be public forums if school authorities
have "by policy or by practice" opened their facilities "for indiscriminate use
by the general public,' 7 or "for other intended purposes[.]"' 7' The Court
looked to the policy and practice of school officials toward Spectrum and
concluded that the newspaper was designed to be a part of the educational
curriculum and a "regular classroom activit[y]," not an open forum for student
expression. 76 Although one issue of Spectrum declared that "Spectrum, as a

interference with the school work or discipline.., or the rights of others." Id. at 1374 (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
172. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
173. Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,515(1939)). The Court in Tinker
seemed to think that schools should also be included in the category of traditional public forums
because "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
174. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 268. "The policy of school officials toward Spectrum was reflected in
Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 and the Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide. Board
Policy 348.51 provided that '[s]chool sponsored publications are developed within the adopted
curriculum and its educational implications in regular classroom activities."' Id. The Hazelwood
East Curriculum Guide described the Journalism II course as a "laboratory situation in which
the students publish the school newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism ."
Id. The Journalism 1I course, according to the Curriculum Guide, was designed to teach
journalistic skills, such as, "the legal, moral and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists
within the school community," and "responsibility and acceptance of criticism for articles of
opinion." Id Journalism II was taught by a faculty member during school hours, and students
received grades and academic credit for their participation in the course. Id The Court found
that "school officials did not deviate in practice from their policy that production of Spectrum
was to be part of the educational curriculum and a 'regular classroom activit[y]."' Id. The Court
found that the journalism teacher "exercised a great deal of control over Spectrum" because he
selected the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, decided the number of pages
for the issues, assigned story ideas to class members, advised students on the development of
their stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, selected and edited the letters to the
editor, and dealt with the printing company.
s Id. The Court found that many of these decisions were made without consulting the
students of the Journalism II class. Id. The Court also determined that the principal of
Hazelwood asserted much control over the newspaper because each issue had to be reviewed
by him prior to publication. Id. at 269.
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student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment,"
the Court held this was not enough to show that the school had intended to
convert the curricular newspaper into a public forum.' Because the Court
concluded that the evidence failed to demonstrate a "clear intent to create a
public forum," Spectrum was determined to be a nonpublic forum.' As a
nonpublic forum, the school officials were able to regulate the newspaper in
any reasonable manner, which the Court found the principal did, when he
deleted two pages of one of the issues.7 9
The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of Spectrum
and agreed with the appellate court that Spectrum was a public forum. The
dissent quoted the appellate court in explaining that Spectrum was a "forum
established to give students an opportunity to express their views while
gaining an appreciation of their rights and responsibilities under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.... ,"80The dissent argued that
the policy of the school actually had been to open the newspaper to create a
public forum as evidenced by the Statement of Policy published in the first
issue of Spectrum at the beginning of the school year and a school board
policy, which announced the free speech rights of students.' Because the
dissent characterized Spectrum as a public forum, the dissenting justices found
that school officials violated the First Amendment because the actions of the
school officials in deleting two pages of the school newspaper were not
narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling government interest.8 2
D. KINCAID V. GIBSON AND THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

The three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit rehearing the
case en banc and the district court judge all addressed the public forum issue
in Kincaid v. Gibson. As noted above, in Kincaid two Kentucky State
177. Id, at 269. The Court explained that this statement, understood in light of the
newspaper's role in the school's curriculum, suggests only that school officials will not interfere

with the students' First Amendment rights that belong to the publication of a school-sponsored
newspaper. Id.

178. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985)).
179. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273,274.
180. Id at 277 (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th
Cir. 1986), rev'd.).
181. Id. The Statement of Policy announced that "Spectrum, as a student-press
publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment ... Only speech that materially
and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline can be found
unacceptable and therefore prohibited." Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). See supra note 176 for School Board Policy 348.51.
182. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 278.
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University students sued a University official for refusing to distribute the
campus yearbook, The Thorobred.8 3 Both the district court and the three
judge panel of the Sixth Circuit found that The Thorobred was a nonpublic
forum, while the Sixth Circuit reviewing the case en banc found the yearbook
to be a limited public forum.1"4
In making his determination, the district court judge explained that
although the Fifth Circuit expressed the view that university publications
would be considered open forums,"'5 he thought that the Supreme Court's
decision in Hazelwood was more controlling even though that case involved
a high school publication."8 " The district court judge relied heavily on
Hazelwood, the Ninth Circuit decision in PlannedParenthoodv. ClarkCounty
School District 7 and the dissent of the First Circuit's three judge panel in Yeo
v. Town of Lexington 8" to conclude that The Thorobredwas neither a public
nor limited public forum.'8 Because the district court judge found that the
plaintiffs failed to show that "The Thorobred was intended to reach or
communicate with anybody but KSU students[,]" he decided that the yearbook
was not created as a limited public or public forum."9

183. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
184. See No. 95-98, slip op. at 12 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997) (district court opinion); 191

F.3d 719, 721 (6th Cir. 1999) (three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit); No. 98-5385, 2001 WL
10600 at *3(6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2001) (en banc) (Sixth Circuit rehearing en banc).
185. No. 95-98, slip op. at 12. He explained that the Fifth Circuit alluded that university
publications were considered open forums in Bazaar v.Fortune.Id at 8-9. See supra notes 15964 and accompanying text for more about Bazaarv. Fortune.
186. No. 95-98, slip op. at 11.

187. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
188. No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (lst Cir. June 6, 1997), rev'd en banc.
189.

Kincaid, No. 95-98, slip op. at 11-12. The district judge explained that Hazelwood

190.

No. 95-98, slip op. at 12.

showed that the intent of the school officials to create a public forum is the crucial element in
determining if a publication is a public or limited public forum. Id. at 11. He quoted Planned
Parenthoodfor the proposition that "under Hazelwood, in cases such as this where school
facilities have not intentionally been opened to indiscriminate expressive use by the public or
some segment of the public, school officials retain the authority reasonably to refuse to lend the
schools' name and resources to speech disseminated under school auspices." Id. at 10-11
(quoting Planned Parenthood,941 F.2d at 828). The judge twice quoted the dissent in the
decision of Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (1st Cir. June 6, 1997),
rev'd en banc, where the dissent explained, "High school yearbooks are not usually vehicles for
expression of views, or for robust debate about societal issues, and they never have been. There
can be no serious argument that this yearbook is a public forum." Kincaid,No. 95-96, slip op.
at 10 (quoting Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *29). Even though the yearbook at issue in Kincaid
was a college yearbook rather than a high school yearbook, as in Yeo, the district court judge
still found the language of Yeo authoritative.

2001]

STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS

The three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit also concluded that The

Thorobred was a nonpublic forum by relying on Hazelwood. 9 ' The panel
explained that based on Hazelwood the "determinative element" of a public
forum inquiry "is the intent of the school in chartering the publication."'" The
court examined the KSU student handbook to determine the university's intent

in creating the yearbook.' 93 The policies written in the handbook gave much

control to the students to create the yearbook and explicitly stated that the
university's intent was to keep the yearbook "as free of censorship as
prevailing law dictates."'' However, the court concluded that Kentucky State

University had not intentionally created The Thorobred to serve as a public
forum because, according to the student handbook, the Student Publications

Board retained much control over the yearbook. 95 The court held that because

191. 191 F.3d 719, 726-28 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc.
192. Id. at 727.
193. Id. at 722. The only written indication of the University's intent regarding the scope
of the oversight at the time of this action could be found in the KSU student handbook in the
section entitled "Student Publications." Id. This section stated:
The Board of Regents respects the integrity of student publications and
the press, and the rights to exist in an atmosphere of free and reasonable
discussion and of intellectual exploration. The Board expects student
editors and faculty advisors to adhere to high standards of journalistic
ethics and the highest level of good taste and maturity in the integrity,
tone and content of student publications.
Id.
194. i According to the student handbook, "The Thorobred News (Student Newspaper)
and the Thorobred yearbook shall be under the management of the Student Publications Board.
Though both publications are subsidized by the University, it is the intent that both shall be as
free of censorship as prevailing law dictates." Id.
195. Id. at 728. According to the school handbook, the Student Publications Board is to:
1. Approve the written publications policy of each student publication,
including such items as purpose, size, quantity controls, and time, place
and manner of distribution;
2. Set qualifications for and (upon nomination by the Student
Publications Advisor) appoint the editor of each publication who shall
serve for a one-year term, unless reappointed or removed by the Board for
cause;
3. Set qualifications for and appoint staff members for each publication
upon nomination of its editor with concurrence of the Student
Publications Advisor, also, remove any of these staff members for cause;
4. Arrange seminars for student publications personnel with skilled
publications experts for discussion of reporting, editing and other
journalistic techniques;
5. Provide the Thorobred News and Thorobred yearbook staffs with
counsel, and encourage them to maintain for fiscal, news and editorial
responsibilities.
i at 722. The school handbook also required the Board to find experienced advisors for the
newspaper and the yearbook to assure that those publications are "not overwhelmed by
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the students failed to prove that the university intended to relinquish control
of The Thorobred to the students, school officials "were entitled to regulate
the contents of the yearbook in any reasonable manner.""9 The court found
that refusing to distribute the yearbook was reasonable because school
officials were displeased with it; therefore, the students' First Amendment
rights were not violated."
The Sixth Circuit rehearing Kincaid v. Gibson en banc disagreed with
both the district court's and three judge panel's determinations that The
Thorobred was a nonpublic forum. Instead, the court rehearing Kincaid en
banc found that the yearbook was a limited public forum by examining the
university's policy and practice toward The Thorobred, the nature of the
yearbook and its compatibility with expressive activity, and the context within
which the case arose.' Upon examining Kentucky State University's policy
toward The Thorobred,the court found that "the policy places editorial control
of the yearbook in the hands of the student editor or editors.""' The
university's practices also led the court to the conclusion that The Thorobred
was a limited public forum because the university followed a "hands off"
policy toward the yearbook.' The court additionally found that the yearbook
was compatible with expressive activity because "[t]he KSU yearbook is a
student publication that, by its very nature, existsfor the purposeof expressive
activity."'' Finally, the court noted that because the yearbook was a university
publication, this mitigated in favor of finding that the yearbook was a limited
public forum.'

ineptitude and inexperience." Id. at 723. The handbook also explained that "[i]n order to meet
responsible standards of journalism, an advisor may require changes in the form of materials
submitted by students, but such changes must deal only with the form or the time and manner
of expressions rather than alteration of its content." IaThe handbook explained that ultimately
"[it is the responsibility of the editor to verify the accuracy of all printed matter, and to

recognize that he/she will be subject to the legal exigencies that my arise from improper
reporting of the news." Id.
196. Id. at 728.
197. Id. at 729.
198. Kincaid v. Gibson, No. 98-5385, 2001 WL 10600, at *4-7 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,2001)
(en banc).
199.

200.
201.

Id. at *5.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7 (emphasis added).

202. Id. The court explained: "The university is a special place for purposes of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The danger of "chilling... individual thought and expression...

is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic
tradition." Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1994).
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The court concluded its decision by stating: "Given KSU' s stated policy
and practice with regard to the yearbook, the nature of the yearbook and its
compatibility with expressive activity, and the university context in which the
yearbook is published, there can be no question that The Thorobred is a
'journal of expression and communication in the public forum sense."'
Although the Sixth Circuit reviewing Kincaid en banc thought that it was
obvious that the Kentucky State University yearbook was a limited public
2
forum, the two courts that examined that issue previously did not agree. '
Numerous courts have employed the public forum doctrine as a means
to declare school buildings and publications nonpublic forums so that school
officials can regulate their content as much as possible. A constitutional.
principle, such as the public forum doctrine, should not be abused by federal
courts in such a way to strip constitutional free speech rights from students.
V. ANALYSIS

One only needs to look back through fifty years of Supreme Court
decisions and lower federal court decisions to realize the declining protection
of students' rights of free speech. The protection of student speech has been
reduced by courts most notably in the past fifteen years. The recent decisions
have reduced students' free speech rights by applying a deferential standard
to school officials' regulations that infringe on student speech and by
misapplying the public forum doctrine.
A. BARNETTE AND TINKER

West VirginiaState Boardof Educationv. Barnette was a powerful and
important decision by the Supreme Court because it announced that students'
freedom of expression rights were paramount over the school's ability to
regulate student expression. 2° In Barnette the Supreme Court showed its
commitment to protecting students' rights by announcing that schools could
not attempt to regulate what students say and do based on what school
officials think is right.' The Court also emphasized the importance ofjudicial
review of school officials' actions to ensure that school officials are setting a

d at*12.
203.
204. See Kincaid v. Gibson, No. 95-98, slip. op. (E.D. Ky Nov. 14, 1997); Kincaid v.
Gibson, 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd.
205. See supra Part l.A. for a discussion of Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
206. See supra text accompanying note 14.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

good example to students about citizenship and democracy by allowing
students to exercise their rights of free speech. 7
The Supreme Court in Tinker followed the Court's lead from Barnette
and continued to emphasize the importance of students' rights.20" The Court
explained that students' rights, as well as the rights of all individuals, deserve
great protection and should not be denied lightly.' The "material and
substantial disruption" test announced in Tinker ensured that students' free
speech rights were not infringed upon arbitrarily by requiring that the
government provide substantial justification for burdening students' First
Amendment rights.2" '
The Supreme Court's decisions in Barnetteand Tinker were passed down
at times of great turmoil in America, when the country was involved in World
War II and the Vietnam War respectively. Although much attention at that
time was focused overseas on those wars, the United States Supreme Court
thought that it was important to protect the rights of children at home by
making sure that students' rights were not trampled on by school officials. For
many years following these decisions, the Supreme Court and lower courts
acknowledged that students rights were important and should be protected.2"'
However, that vigilant protection of students' rights came to an end with the
Court's decisions of Hazelwood and Fraser.
B. HAZELWOOD AND FRASER

In the Supreme Court decision of Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,the Court began its analysis by quoting the now-famous line from
Tinker that students do not "shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
gate."2 '2 However, the decision announced in Fraserproved that statement to
no longer be true because if Matthew Fraser had given the same speech
outside of school, he could not have been penalized for his "inappropriate"
speech. By failing to apply the "material and substantial disruption" standard
introduced by Tinker, the Supreme Court did in fact strip constitutional rights
207. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. See supra text accompanying note 12.
208. See supra Part I.B.
209. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). See supra text
accompanying notes 25-26.
210. See Laura S. Kohl, FirstAmendment l: The Commercial Press v. The Student Press,
1989 ANN.SURV. AM. L 177, 203 (1990) ("Tinker puts the burden on school authorities to
prove that the Tinker requirements are satisfied before they can restrict students' expression.").
211. See supra note 28; supra Part 1.C-E.
212. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); see supra Part II.A. for more on
Fraser.
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of free speech and expression from all students."' If the "material and
substantial disruption" test had been employed, the speech involved would not
have been restricted because the evidence failed to show that Fraser's speech
24
had in fact caused a disruption of the school environment.
The constitutional rights of students were shed once again when the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Hazelwood.2" By again refusing to
apply the "material and substantial disruption" standard from Tinker, the
Court showed a disregard for students' free speech rights.21 6 Hazelwood
marked a giant step away from protecting student rights to free speech by
allowing wide-ranging control by school administrators. Unlike the speech in
Fraser,the articles in Hazelwood were not lewd, yet the Supreme Court
granted wide latitude to the school administrators to determine "whether to
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics."21 In doing so, the
Supreme Court greatly lowered the requirement announced in Tinker for
censoring student speech because the school's principal was never required
to show that the material found in the censored articles would have been
materially and substantially disruptive to students. If he had been required to
do so, the principal's actions would not have been upheld because there was
no evidence that the articles contained material that would have disrupted the
educational environment of the school.2 8
Another disturbing aspect of both Hazelwood and Fraseris the great
amount of deference given to school officials. 1 9 In those decisions the Court
was willing to defer to school authorities without even examining the impact
the school officials' decisions had on the rights of the students involved. 2'
213. See Traci B. Edwards, Note, Shedding Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate:
Recent Supreme Court Cases Have Severely Restricted the ConstitutionalRights Available to
Public Schoolchildren., 14 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 97, 118 (1989).
214. See id at 120 ("Hooting, yelling and gesturing can hardly be seen to be a 'material
and substantial disruption."').
215. See supra Part lI.B. for an examination of Hazelwood.
216. See Kohl, supranote 210, at 210 ("The overall result [of the Hazelwood decision]
is the Court's clear retreat from protecting the first amendment rights of students in the public
schools.").
217. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. The court explained sensitive topics may "range from
the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual
activity in a high school setting." l
218. See J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, Comment, Endof an Era? The Decline
of Student PressRights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKEL.
J. 706, 724 (1988).
219. See Kohl, supra note 210, at 203 (explaining that, unlike Tinker, Hazelwood
requires courts to defer to the discretion of school officials.)
220. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs - Repression, Rights and
Respect: A Primerof Student Speech Activities, 37 B. C. L REV. 119, 122 (1995) ("Under the
Supreme Court's Frazer/Hazelwood test.., federal courts have largely discounted the value of

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

The effect of FraserlHazelwoodjudicialdeference to school officials allows

schools broad authority to suppress speech that they disagree with and leaves
" '
students little protection against such actions.22

C. EFFECTS OF HAZELWOOD AND FRASER

The First Amendment rights of students became less valued by lower
courts following Fraserand Hazelwood. The decisions announced since
Fraserand Hazelwood involving student speech rights have been moving
further and further away from the standards first set by Barnette and Tinker.
Although Barnette stated that school officials cannot "prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.." 22 2
this is exactly what the courts did in the decisions following Fraserand
Hazelwood by allowing school officials to prescribe what students can say in
speeches,223 what books students are allowed to read, 22 which students may
run for office, 2" what students may wear to school,226 what kinds of
invitations students can pass out, 227 and what a yearbook should or should not
include.228
The decisions following Hazelwood were even more far-reaching than
Hazelwood itself because many of those decisions did not even involve typical
school-sponsored activities, but the courts still applied Hazelwood's
deferential standard. In relying on Hazelwood, the lower courts seemed to
accept the Supreme Court's definition of "school-sponsored," which includes

student speech in order to provide school boards with broad discretionary authority to control
and discipline students.").
221. Several courts have relied on the Hazelwood decision to restrict students' free
speech rights. In Krizek v. Boardof Education, 713 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989), a district
court applied the Hazelwoodstandard broadly to uphold restrictions on the content of classroom
materials. In Crosby v. Holsinger,852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988), an appellate court used the
Hazelwoodstandard tojustify a school official's elimination of the high school's "Johnny Reb"
mascot and symbol.
222. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
223. See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989); supra Part III.A.
224. See Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (1lth Cir. 1989); supra Part HI.B.
225. See Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. #15,745 F. Supp. 1455 (E.D. Ark. 1990);
supra Part III.C.
226. See Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994); supra Part
III.D.
227. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996); supra Part
III.D.
228. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d719(6thCir. 1999), rev'den banc, No 98-5385,
2001 WL 10600 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,2001); Kincaid v. Gibson, 95-98, slip op. (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14,
1997); supra Part III.E.
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almost any activity that takes place on school property. 2 In defining schoolsponsored activities so broadly, activities that are not traditionally schoolrelated have been characterized as such, and school officials have be allowed
to censor them, as long as they do so reasonably.'
The decisions following Fraserand Hazelwoodall remained true to the
deferential standard introduced by the Supreme Court in those cases. Courts
in opinions following Fraser and Hazelwood continued to give great
deference to the judgments and decisions made by school officials. Those
courts seemed to send a message to school officials that almost any restriction
placed on students' First Amendment rights would be presumed to be
reasonable and would be upheld.
D. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

The public forum doctrine has played a major role in the decisions of the
Supreme Court and lower courts in limiting students' First Amendment rights
since Hazelwood. In Hazelwood and many of the cases decided since that
Supreme Court decision, the public forum doctrine has been applied
erroneously to restrict students' free speech rights.
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court incorrectly applied the public forum
doctrine introduced by Perryand further explained by Cornelius.23 ' Cornelius
explained that it is necessary to examine the policy and practice of the
government to determine if a limited public forum has been created. 2
However, the Supreme Court in Hazelwood did not appear to examine either
the policy or the practice of school officials in creating Spectrum. Even though
the Statement of Policy published in Spectrum announced that "Spectrum, as
a student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First
Amendment," and a school board policy stated, "school sponsored student
publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the
rules of responsible journalism," the Supreme Court disregarded these policy

229. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988), the Court
defined "school-sponsored" as all activities that might "fairly be characterized as part of the
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they
are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
student participants and audiences."
230. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that school officials could reject advertisements for athletic publications not
created in connection with any class); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd
en banc, (allowing university officials to ban publication of university yearbook not created in
any class).
231. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text for an explanation of Cornelius.
232. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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statements and held that the school-sponsored nature of the newspaper
determined that Spectrum was a nonpublic forum.233 The Court also
disregarded the practice of school officials in Hazelwood because Spectrum
had been a forum open for student expression where students were allowed to
make decisions about what to write and had written about many controversial
subjects in the past.' By disregarding both the policy and practice of school
officials in Hazelwood, the Court did not faithfully apply the public forum
doctrine. The Court further misapplied the public forum doctrine in
Hazelwood by distinguishing school-sponsored expression from other types
of expression, therebyS creating a new forum that was not outlined in either
Perry or Cornelius.2
In Kincaid v. Gibson, both the three judge panel of the circuit court and
the district court incorrectly applied the public forum doctrine to determine
that a college yearbook was a nonpublic forum because both courts failed to
examine both the policies and practices of the university. The district court
reached its conclusion by relying heavily on high school publications cases
where the courts had determined that the schools had not intended to "open

up" the forums. 2" The district court judge did not appear to examine the
policies or practices of university officials at all but instead relied on previous
cases, especially the dissent in the First Circuit's three judge panel decision

of Yeo v. Town of Lexington, where one judge explained that yearbooks by
nature were nonpublic forums.2 "1By relying on previous cases and failing to

233. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (1986), rev'd. The
newspaper advisor explained that Spectrum was a "student newspaper" where students decided
what stories to write, decided the content of those stories, and wrote the stories. Id Since 1976,
students had published stories dealing with teenage dating, student drug and alcohol abuse,
school desegregation, religion, cults and runaways. Id.
235. See John R. Craddock, Case Comment, The First Amendment Rights of Public
School Students Are Not Violated When School OfficialsImpose ReasonableEditorialControl
Over the Content of School-Sponsored Publications, 30 S. TEX. L. REV. 193, 212 (1988)
(explaining that the Court misapplied the public forum doctrine in Hazelwood "by introducing
school-sponsored expression as a separate category of speech"); see also Kohl, supra note 210,
at 210 (explaining that the Court's distinction between school-sponsored and personal
expression contradicts precedent).
236. Kincaid v. Gibson, No. 95-98, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997). The district
court judge cited the three high school cases of Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988), PlannedParenthoodv. Clark County School District,941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1991) and the dissent of Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (1st Cir.
Jun. 6, 1997), rev'd en banc 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) in reaching his conclusion that the
university yearbook was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 4-5.
237. No. 95-98, slip op. at 4. The dissenting judge in Yeo explained, "High school
yearbooks are not usually vehicles for the expression of views, or for robust debate about
societal issues, and they never have been. There can be no serious argument that this yearbook
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examine the actual practices and policies of the university officials, the district
court judge did not properly analyze the public forum doctrine in Kincaid.
The three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also
erroneously applied the public forum doctrine by looking almost exclusively
at one policy of the university, rather than examining all of the school's
policies and practices to determine whether the university yearbook was a
public, limited public or nonpublic forum. The court's decision that The
Thorobred was a nonpublic forum was reached by relying only on the written
policies of the university which gave much control to school officials. The
Sixth Circuit, however, failed to consider on the statement in the Student
handbook which stated that the yearbook was to remain "as free of censorship
as prevailing law dictates." 8 The court also failed to examine the practices
of the school officials in their control over the yearbook. In fact, the court
explained that the school's policies were determinative in deciding what type
of forum the yearbook was. 9 Because the court failed to analyze the actual
practices of school officials in giving great control of the yearbook to students,
the Sixth Circuit left out an important part of the public forum analysis since
the public forum analysis requires both policies and practices to be examined
to determine what type of forum was created.'"
The Sixth Circuit reviewing Kincaidv. Gibson en banc specifically noted
that the district court judge "misapplie[d] well-established public forum law"
in his decision."" The court found that the district court erroneously
concluded that The Thorobred was a nonpublic forum simply because the
yearbook was not open "for indiscriminate use by the general public." 2 The
panel explained that even though the yearbook was created mainly for
Kentucky State University students, it was a limited public forum based on the
university's policies and practices toward the yearbook, the nature of the
yearbook and its compatibility with expressive activities and the university
context in which the yearbook was created. 3
is a public forum." 1997 WL 292173, at *29. Even though the yearbook at issue in Kincaidwas
a college publication, the district judge found this opinion from Yeo persuasive.
238. 191 F.3d 719, 722 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc; see supra note 195 for the
applicable statement in the student handbook.
239. 191 F.3d at 727.
240. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) ("[T]he Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a
public forum.") (emphasis added).
241. Kincaid v. Gibson, 98-5385, WL 10600, at *12 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2001).
242. Id. at *8(quoting Perry,460 U.S. at 47) (explaining that opening the forum to the
general public is only one way to create a limited public forum).
243. Id. at *12; see supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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The public forum doctrine was incorrectly applied beginning in
Hazelwood and continuing until the Sixth Circuit's 1999 decision in Kincaid
v. Gibson.The Supreme Court as well as the lower courts deciding those cases
were incorrect in relying on only one prong and sometimes neither prong of
the traditional public forum analysis. The public forum analysis requires
courts to look at both the policies and practices of school officials to
determine what type of forum was created. The Supreme Court in Hazelwood
and the Eastern District of Kentucky in Kincaid did not properly examine
either of these, while the three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit in Kincaidonly
relied on the school policies and ignored the procedures and actions of the
school and its officials.
Allowing schools to retain great control by simply creating a written
policy that states that they do, is in direct conflict with Supreme Court
precedents. In SoutheasternPromotions,Ltd. v. Conrad,2" the Supreme Court
announced that the mere intent to create a nonpublic forum was an invalid
safeguard of censorship.24 The Court explained "that the danger of censorship
and of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great
where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use. '" 21 Likewise in
Widmar v. Vincent, the Court looked beyond the explicit written policy of a
university, which declared its intent to create a nonpublic forum, and
determined that "[t]hrough its policy of accommodating meetings, the
University ha[d] created a forum generally open for use by student groups. '
If the Supreme Court in Hazelwood and the three judge panel of the Sixth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Kentucky in Kincaid v. Gibson had
remained true to the public forum doctrine and explored both the policies and
practices of the schools in creating the publications, they would have found
that the schools had in fact created limited public forums.
The only court to correctly apply the public forum doctrine was the en
banc panel deciding Kincaid v. Gibson because those judges correctly
examined and analyzed the policies and practices of the university in reaching
their conclusion that The Thorobred was a public forum. When the Sixth
Circuit did correctly analyzed the public forum doctrine, those judges reached
the opposite conclusion that the lower courts reached and ultimately found
that the yearbook was a limited public forum"' 8

244. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
245. Id. at 553.
246. Id.
247. 454 U.S. 263,267(1981); see supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text for more
on Widmar.
248. See supra text accompanying note 243.
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E. KINCAID V. GIBSON AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

Since the district court announced its decision in Kincaid v. Gibson, the
rights of college students have come into question because both the district
court opinion and the original Sixth Circuit decision applied the lenient
standard of Hazelwood to college students. The district court decision held
that the college yearbook in Kincaid was a nonpublic forum by relying on
decisions where high school publications were at issue and allowed the
restrictions of college officials to stand because they were "reasonable."' 9
The decisions in Kincaid were even more far-reaching than Hazelwood itself
because not only did the courts determine that the Hazelwood standard should
apply to college students, but the courts also concluded that the actions of the
school officials were reasonable even though the yearbook in question did not
fit into any of the categories outlined in Hazelwood for material that could be
censored.' Simply because university officials did not agree with the content
of the yearbook, the university was allowed to ban it.
The fact that the en banc panel reversed the decisions of the district court
and Sixth Circuit demonstrate that some courts still believe that protecting
students' free speech rights is a worthwhile cause and that judges want to
make sure that students are receiving protection. It is disturbing, however, that
two earlier courts did not see the benefit in protecting such free speech.
The new decision of Kincaid v. Gibson may not stand for long because
it may be appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which does not have
a good track record for protecting students' free speech rights in the last
fifteen years."5 Until the case is appealed and heard by the Supreme Court,
lower courts have some persuasive authority to argue that college students'
rights should not be limited in the same way that younger students' rights have
been.
Because many courts have been unwilling to protect student speech rights
in recent years, it is necessary for courts and/or legislatures to make some
changes to ensure that students' rights are protected. Some solutions that will

249.

250.

No. 95-98, slip op. at 11-12 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997).

According to Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988):

[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a school play
"disassociate itself," Fraser,478 U.S., at 685, not only from speech that would "substantially
interfere with work... or impinge upon the rights of other students," Tinker, 393 U.S., at 509,
but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.
251. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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provide increased protection for students' free speech rights are provided
below.

VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. RETURN TO THE TINKER STANDARD

The best solution to ensure that students receive the rights that they

deserve would be to return to the "material and substantial disruption"

standard set forth in Tinker and apply that standard at all times to all student
speech regardless of the type of speech involved instead of differentiating
between "school-sponsored" and personal speech. 2 Tinker created a
workable standard for dealing with the First Amendment rights of students and
was successful at doing so for almost thirty years." The standard created by
Tinker was easily identifiable because it is not difficult to determine if
something materially and substantially disrupt the educational environment or
has the potential to do so.2" Federal court cases provide a long line of
precedent that courts could apply and follow to determine what types of
activities would be considered to be materially and substantially disruptive."'
Tinker was also useful because it struck a fair balance between protecting
students' freedom of speech and preserving the "marketplace of ideas" in
schools while making sure that the students' speech and actions did not
disrupt other students or invade the rights of others.'
The Supreme Court incorrectly moved away from the standard set forth
in Tinker for several reasons. First of all, while the justices deciding
Hazelwoodand Fraserwere unwilling to admit it, the Court did overrule the
standard set in Tinker. By doing so, the Court did not follow the doctrine of
stare decisis.2 s7 Because Tinker did set forth a workable standard for dealing
with student speech in schools, the Supreme Court should not have set aside
the standard created in that case. Secondly, the Tinker standard was successful
in demonstrating the value of democracy to students by showing students that
their rights and freedoms would only be reduced if they acted in a way that
disrupted school discipline or invaded the rights of others."5 8 By not applying
the Tinkerstandard, courts are teaching students that the Constitution does not

252.
253.

See Edwards, supra note 213, at 128.
See id.

258.

See id.

254. See id.
255. See supra Part I.B-E.
256. See Edwards, supra note 213, at 129.
257. See id.
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protect their First Amendment rights while they are on school property in the
same way that it protects other people's First Amendment rights in other
settings. Finally, the system established by Tinkerensures that students' rights
are adequately protected by allowing judicial review of regulations that
restrict student speech."9 Judicial review of these types of regulations is
necessary to ensure that students' rights are not being trampled on by school
officials who are more concerned about order than the First Amendment rights
of students.
Returning to the Tinker standard and allowing increased judicial review
of regulations that restrict student speech provides a fair balance between a
school's interest in running an orderly school and society's interest in
protecting students' First Amendment rights.' ° Students should be able to turn
to the courts when their rights have been abused, and school officials should
be required to justify their actions by arguing more than the low standard of
reasonableness. School officials would be less likely to abuse their power and
make arbitrary decisions if they knew that they would be forced to justify
those decisions in a court of law.26 '
B. ABANDON THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

Clearly missing from the Supreme Court's decisions in Tinker and
Barnette is any discussion of the public forum doctrine. The absence of any
public forum analysis in those cases highlights that the public forum doctrine
is unnecessary in dealing with students' First Amendment rights in schools.
Instead of focusing so much attention on the classification of the place or
publication involved, as the public forum doctrine does, the Supreme Court
and lower courts should spend their time focusing on the individual rights
involved and whether they have been infringed upon.262 To determine whether
259.

See Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV.

625, 652 (1984) (arguing that students faced with free speech restraints should have the right
to look to courts for review).
260. See R. W. Westling, Recent Development, HazelwoodSchoolDistrictv. Kuhlmeier:

AnAdministrator'sAuthorityto Exercise PriorRestraintOver School-SponsoredPublications,

62 TUL. L. REV. 1467, 1474 ("The Tinker rule has... achieved a balance between the rights of
students and interests of school administrators in maintaining discipline.").

261. See Note, supra note 259, at 653.
262. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1224
(1984) ("[P]ublic forum analysis... distracts attention from the first amendment values at stake
in a given case."); Jeffrey D. Smith, Comment, High School Newspapers and the Public Forum
Doctrine:Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier,74 VA. L. REV. 843,856 (1988) (describing
the public forum doctrine as a "flawed analytical tool" that focuses on places rather than
constitutional rights).
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a student's rights have been infringed upon, courts should look to the standard
created in Tinker instead of trying to classify the type of forum involved.
Members of the judiciary criticize the traditional public forum doctrine
because they believe it confuses the issues involved in a First Amendment
case. In his dissent in UnitedStates v. Kokinda,2 63 Justice Brennan explained:
[The] public forum categories - originally conceived of as
a way of preserving First Amendment rights - have been
used in some of our recent decisions as a means of
upholding restrictions on speech. I have questioned whether
public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in
recent cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the
issues at hand. 2"
Justice Brennan, like many judges, became frustrated that the public forum
doctrine was being employed not to simplify First Amendment issues but
instead to confuse them and allow more and more restrictions to be placed on
individuals' free speech rights.
The traditional public forum analysis not-only focuses courts' attention
on the wrong issues, but it also yields inconsistent results.265 A telling example
of the confusion caused by the public forum doctrine is the trouble that the
various courts had in determining whether the newspaper involved in
Hazelwood was or was not a public forum. Relying on the same facts, one
court concluded that Spectrum was a limited public forum, and two courts
Another example of the
concluded it was a nonpublic forum.'
misinterpretation of the public forum analysis can be found in Kincaid v.
Gibson, where two courts concluded that the college yearbook was a
nonpublic forum before a third court finally determined that it was a limited
public forum.6 7 Because it is so difficult for judges to determine how to apply
the traditional public forum analysis, it should be set aside so that a more
workable analysis can be put in its place.
The present public forum analysis is also flawed because it focuses too
much on the intent of a school to open itself to the public or to allow its own

263. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
264. Id. at 741.
265. Examples of inconsistent results can be found by comparing UnitedStates v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983), where the Supreme Court held that sidewalk outside ofthe Supreme Court
building is a public forum, with United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), where a
plurality of the Supreme Court found that the sidewalk outside of a United States Post Office
was not a public forum.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
267. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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students to express themselves. In doing so, the traditional public forum
doctrine seems to reward those schools that keep their doors closed by
allowing school officials to make all of the regulations they desire without
having to examine the impact those regulations have on students' rights. In the
recent cases where courts have applied the public forum doctrine, the Supreme
Court and lower courts send the message to schools that as long as school
officials do not intend to give students freedom of speech and expression,
students have little recourse when their free speech rights are denied because
the school has not created a public forum.2' After analyzing the current public
forum doctrine as applied to school settings, it is difficult to understand why
a school would ever create a limited public forum.269 By keeping their schools
closed, school officials can control what is going on in their schools without
having to explain the restrictions they have set in place, no matter how much
they hinder students' rights.
Because courts would probably be unwilling to abandon the public forum
analysis entirely, they should at least replace the traditional analysis with an
analysis that creates more consistent results and limits the restrictions that can
be placed on*students' First Amendment rights. An analysis which may do so,
if used properly, is the "incompatibility test" first outlined in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Grayned v. City of Rockford" 0 In Grayned the
Supreme Court held that the test to determine whether an activity should be
allowed on public property was "whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time."27
An independent review under the Grayned test would determine if the
property is compatible with an activity, rather than simply declaring that if a
forum is not a traditional public forum, it must be closed unless the
government specifically designated it as open. The Grayned test is better
suited to deal with students' rights because it focuses more on practices than
policies. Under the traditional public forum analysis, the courts heavily weigh
268. See, e.g., Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (holding
that because the evidence failed to demonstrate "a clear intent to create a public forum[,]" the
school newspaper was a nonpublic forum); Planned Parenthood v. Clark County, 941 F.2d 817,
824-25 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the publications in issue were nonpublic forums because
school authorities did not intend to give control to students); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719,
726-27 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd, (concluding that the "intent of the school in chartering the
publication" determines whether or not a public forum is created).
269. See William Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum and the FirstAmendment,
74 IOWA L. REv. 505, 522 (1989) ("It is reasonable to ask why a school should create student
rights of this sort if it does not have to.").
270. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
271. Id. at 116.
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the intent of school officials to either open the forum or keep it closed. Often
when examining the intent of school officials, courts look to the-written policy
of the school rather than the school's actual practices. 2 Under the Grayned
incompatibility test, the courts would no longer focus on what the school
intended but instead would look at the nature of the forum itself to determine
if the activity proposed would be compatible with that forum. If the Grayned
test were employed in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and appellate
courts, the outcomes would have been markedly different because it can
hardly be argued that high school newspapers or college yearbooks are
incompatible with student expression.
The Grayned incompatibility test is a viable alternative to the current
public forum analysis since the traditional public forum analysis places too
much emphasis on categorizing the place involved and does not place enough
emphasis on the activity that is being restricted. However, the "incompatibility
test" may also suffer from the same flaw as the traditional public forum
analysis because it may be abused by members of the judiciary who use it to
limit rather than uphold First Amendment rights. Even so, the Grayned test
should be employed instead of the traditional public forum analysis because,
if used properly, it would yield more consistent results for students as well as
all individuals when their First Amendment rights have been
unconstitutionally restricted.
C. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Since federal courts seem unwilling to vehemently protect students'
rights, some states have passed legislation to ensure that the students in their
states are protected.2 3 Five states currently have legislation that protects high
school students' rights to expression.27 ' California actually had a statute on its
books ten years prior to the decision in Hazelwood that protected the free

272. In Hazelwood, the Court seemed to focus more on the policies than practices of
school officials since the court failed to recognize that Spectrum was a forum for student
expression even though the newspaper's advisor explained that the newspaper was run and
controlled by students. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir.
1986), rev'd. The three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit in Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719,
726-29 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, also relied almost exclusively on the school's written
policies to determine the university yearbook was a nonpublic forum. See supra text
accompanying notes 238-40.
273. See Martha M. McCarthy, PostHazelwoodDevelopments:A Threatto Free Inquiry
in Public Schools, 81 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 685, 700 (1993).
274. See Alexander Wohl, The Hazelwood Hazard: Litigating and Legislating in the
State Domain When FederalAvenues are Closed, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 20 (1992).
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press and free speech rights of high school students.27 After the Supreme
Court's ruling the law took on new significance and granted California public
school students substantial freedoms of the press despite the ruling in
Hazelwood. 6 Massachusetts, also with a statute on its books that had
previously been elective, made that legislation compulsory toward school
officials in order to protect rights of students to freedoms of speech and
expression.2 7 Since 1988, Iowa,"h Colorado, 9 and Kansas2"' have joined
275. See Robert J. Shoop, States Talk Back to the Supreme Court: "Students Should be
HeardAs Well As Seen," 59 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 579, 581 (1990).
276. The California Education Code states in part:
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise freedom of
speech and of the press including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin
boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of
buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right of expression in official
publications whether or not such publications or other means of.
expression are supported financially by the school or by use of school
facilities, except... material which so incites students as to create a clear
and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school
premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial
disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
Student editors of official school publications shall be responsible for
assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature content of their
publications subject to the limitations of this section ....
There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school
publications except insofar as it violates this section. School officials
shall have the burden of showing justification without undue delay prior
to any limitation of student expression under this section.
"Official school publications" refers to material produced by the
students in the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and
distributed to the student body either free or for a fee.
CAL EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1999).
277. The Massachusetts law states in pertinent part:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth
shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within
the school. Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the rights and
responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through
speech and symbols, (b)to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble peaceably
on school property for the purpose of expressing their opinions ....MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 7 1,§82 (West 1996). This statute was initially elective for school districts in Massachusetts,
but on July 14, 1988, in response to the Hazelwooddecision, the legislature made the provision
mandatory. See 1988 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. Ch. 137 (Law. Co-op.).
278. The Iowa law states in part:
1. Except as limited by this section, students of the public school have the
right to exercise freedom of speech, including the right of expression in
official school publications.
2. Students shall not express, publish or distribute any of the following:
c. Materials which encourage students to do any of the following:
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California and Massachusetts in enacting legislation that protects the free

(3) Cause the material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation
of the school.
3. There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school
publications except when the material violates this section.
5. Student editors of official school publications shall assign and edit the
news, editorial, and feature content of their publications subject to the
limitations of this section ....
7. "Official school publications" means material produced by students in
the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and distributed
to the student body either free or for a fee.
IOWA CODE § 280.22 (1997).
279. The Colorado law states in part:
(1) The general assembly declares that students of the public schools have
the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press, and no
expression contained in a student. publication, whether or not such
publication is school-sponsored shall be subject to prior restraint except
for the types of expression described in subsection (3) of this section....
(2) If a publication written substantially by students is made generally
available throughout a public school, it shall be a public forum for
students of such school.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to authorize the
publication or distribution by students of the following
(d) Expression which creates a clear and present danger of the
commission of unlawful acts, the violation of lawful school regulations,
or the material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the
school or which violates the rights of others to privacy.
(5)(a) Student editors of school-sponsored student publications shall be
responsible for determining the news, opinions and advertising content
of their publications subject to the limitations of this section.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-120 (1998).

280. The Kansas law states in part:
(a) The liberty of the press in student publications shall be protected.
School employees may regulate the number, length frequency,
distribution and format of student publications. Material shall not be
suppressed solely because it involves political or controversial subject
matter.
(c) Publication or other expression . . . which creates a material or
substantial disruption of the normal school activity is not protected by
this act.
(d) Subject to the limitations imposed by this section, student editors of
student publications are responsible for determining the news, opinions,
and advertising content of such publications.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1506 (1998).
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speech rights of students. Although each of the laws has different wording,

they all provide students with greater protection than they have been afforded
under the First Amendment standard defined in Hazelwood because each uses
the "material and substantial disruption" test from Tinker as the primary
limitation on students' rights."
Because the earlier decisions by courts in Kincaid v. Gibson have cast
some doubt on even the free speech rights of college students, legislation may
be necessary to protect those students as well. So far California is the only
state to have laws that protect students in the college context."2 The laws
apply to community colleges, state universities and private universities. The
California law protecting private university students dictates that a private
university student has the sam rights to free speech on campus as off
campus.2" 3 The legislation protecting students of community colleges and state
universities also ensures that the free speech rights of students on campus are

equal to their rights when off campus.'

281. See supra Part I.B. for a discussion of Tinker and the "material and substantial
disruption" test.
282.
1999).
283.

See CAL EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1999); CAL EDUC. CODE § 66301 (West

The law states in part:

(a) No private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce

any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the
basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that, when
engaged in outside the campus or facility of a private postsecondary
institution, is protected from governmental restriction by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article Iof
the California Constitution.
CAL EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1999).
284. The legislation provides in part:
(a) Neither the Regents ofthe University of California, the Trustees ofthe
California State University, nor the governing board of any community
college district shall make or enforce any rule subjecting any student to
disciplinary sanction solely on the basis of conduct that is speech OR
OTHER COMMUNICATION THAT, WHEN ENGAGED INOUTSIDE ACAMPUS OF
THOSE INSTITUTIONS, ISPROTECTED FROM GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTION
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR
SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CALFORNiA CONSTITUTION.

(B)ANY student enrolled in an institution, as specified in subdivision (a),
that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivision (a) may
commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and declaratory
relief as determined by the court. Upon motion, a court may award
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil action pursuant to this
section.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any prior
restraint of student speech.
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Not only have states introduced legislation to increase the free speech
rights of their students, but federal legislation has also been enacted to help
protect students' First Amendment rights. The Equal Access Act has been
used to grant greater First Amendment protection to student expression in
federally funded schools. 5 According to the Equal Access Act, if a federally
assisted high school creates a forum for non-curriculum student groups to
meet during non-instructional time, access to that forum cannot be denied
based on the content of the meetings. 6 The act seems to give a broader
definition of what constitutes a public forum than what was interpreted by the
Court in Hazelwood.
Although several states and the federal government have been successful
in passing legislation that grants greater rights to students, not all legislation
introduced to increase students' First Amendment rights has been
successful.287 Since some legislatures are unwilling to pass legislation that
guarantees First Amendment protections for students, students may have to
look to other alternatives to grant them the rights they deserve.
D. STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Another alternative for students whose rights are being abridged, is 288
to
look to state constitutions as a way to protect their First Amendment rights.

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (West 1999).
285. See McCarthy, supra note 273.
286. The Equal Access Act provides in part:
(a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political,
philosophical, or other speech context prohibited. It shall be unlawful for
any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance
and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct
a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) "Limited open forum" defined. A public secondary school has a
limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or
opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet
on school premises during noninstructional time.
20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1999).
287. See Shoop, supranote 275, at 582. Legislation introduced in Nevada to establish
free speech and press rights for students on school property was defeated in the Senate by a vote
of 14-7. Id A freedom of expression bill in Hawaii passed the House and Senate, but was vetoed
by the Governor. Id. at 581 n. 11.
288. See Brady C. Williamson & James A. Friedman, State Constitutions:The Shopping
Mall Cases, 1998 Wis. L REV. 883, 883 (1998) ("Every state has within its constitution a

provision that protects freedom of speech and assembly - often in language more expansive, or
at least more detailed, than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."); Woh,
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Although the First Amendment sets minimum standards for protecting speech,
state courts are not prevented from providing greater speech to their own
citizens."' At least forty-three state constitutions grant affirmative free
speech rights to citizens. 2" Courts in many states, including California,"'
Massachusetts,292 Colorado," 3 New Jersey, 29 Texas,29 and Illinois' have
interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater free speech rights than
those provided under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Greater rights are inferred under these state constitutions because the
state constitutional free speech provisions give citizens the affirmative right
to free speech rather than simply limiting the action of the government to
restrict that speech. A typical example of a free speech provision found in a
supra note 274, at 18 ("In the context of free speech, most state constitutions have provisions
that can be, or have been interpreted to be more expansive than the Federal Constitution.").
289. See William I. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L REV. 489, 489-502 (1977). In Lloyd Corp v. Tanner,407 U.S. 551 (1972),
the Supreme Court announced that states could adopt constitutional provisions conferring
greater protection than those of the U.S. Constitution, and in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973), the Supreme Court held that states are free to allow obscenity under
their own laws even though obscenity is unprotected under the First Amendment.
290. See Note, PrivateAbridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions,90 YALE L.J.
165, 180-181 n. 79 (1980); see also Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 37-58 (Tex. 1993)
(containing a compendium of state free speech clauses).
291. See Wilson v. Superior Ct., 532 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1975) ("A protective provision
more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is contained in our state constitutional
guarantee of the right of free speech and press."); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980), (announcing that the California state constitution provides more expansive free
speech rights than that provided under the First Amendment).
292. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Mass. 1983)
(explaining that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provided broader speech rights than
the U.S. Constitution).
293. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55,58 (Colo. 1991) (announcing that
the Colorado affirmative free speech provision "enhances the already preferred position of
speech under the First Amendment").
294. See New Jersey Coalition Against War v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,760,
779 (N.J. 1994) (holding that the New Jersey Constitution protected political leafleting at a
private shopping center that would not have been protected by the First Amendment).
295. See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 11 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that the Texas
Constitution's affirmative grant of free speech rights prevented the issuance of gag orders, even
though the First Amendment would not); O'Quinn v. State Bar, 763 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Tex.
1988) ("[lIt is quite obvious that the Texas Constitution's affirmative grant of free speech is
more broadly worded than the first amendment's proscription of Congress from abridging
freedom of speech.").
296. See Village of South Holland v. Stein, 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Il. 1940) ("The
constitution of Illinois is even more far-reaching than that of the constitution of the United
States in providing that every person may speak freely, write and publish on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty."); People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336,342, (111. 1992)
(announcing that Article I, § 4 of the Illinois Constitution should be given a more expansive
reading than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
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state constitution is the free speech clause of the California Constitution,
which states, "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."297 This affirmative
grant of speech rights is markedly different than the free speech clause of the
shall make no law
United States Constitution which provides that "Congress
298
press."
the
of
or
speech,
of
freedom
...abridging the
The wording of state constitutional provisions like California's allows
more room to argue that students' rights are being violated when their speech
is restricted. The state constitutions give greater freedom to all individuals,
since they grant these affirmative free speech rights to "every person. ' 99
Granting free speech rights to "every person" acknowledges that even children
have free speech rights, which is something that the federal courts interpreting
the First Amendment have not seemed to recognize. The speech rights granted
also typically cover "all subjects;"' therefore, it can be argued that any
restrictions of speech based on subject matter are automatically
unconstitutional. When read as a whole, State constitutional provisions, such
as the one granted by the California Constitution and many other state
constitutions, provide greater free speech rights and should be used as an
alternative means of protecting students' rights when the First Amendment
protection is inadequate to do so.
A few states have also used their state constitutions to decide public
forum issues, and in doing so have allowed greater free speech rights for their
citizens. A California Court of Appeals in U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs
Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,"j rejected the
traditional public forum analysis set forth in Perr 0 2 by applying state
constitutional principles. In analyzing the public forum question, the
California Appellate Court first noted the California Supreme Court's
observation that "federal principles are relevant but not conclusive" for

297. CAL CONST. art. 1,§ 2. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 5-5, 5.02 (1995) ("The elements

of a typical state free speech guarantee are that (1) every person (2) may freely speak, write, and
publish (3) his or her sentiments or opinion on (4) all subjects (5) while remaining responsible
for the abuse of the right, and that (6) no law shall restrain or restrict these rights.").
298. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
299. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art 1,§ 2 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish
")(emphasis added).
his or her sentiments on all subjects ....
300. See, e.g., id. ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects.....") (emphasis added).
301. 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
302. See Part IV.A for a description of the public forum analysis set forth in PerryEduc.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator'sAss'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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conducting the state constitutional analysis.' 3 The court then decided that the
fact specific incompatibility test from Graynedv. City of Rockford was more
appropriate for the public forum analysis under their state constitution.' In
applying the incompatibility test, the court found that the visitor center of a
nuclear power facility was compatible for the presentation of an anti-nuclear
program; therefore, the plaintiff had the right to use the center even though
the nuclear power facility opposed such a presentation.3 5
Another state also diverged from the Supreme Court's traditional public
forum analysis when applying its state constitutional guarantees of free
speech. In Ex Parte Tucci, ° the Texas Supreme Court found that under the
free speech provision of the Texas Constitution 3 ° restrictions in a public
forum had to be limited. The Texas Supreme Court held that time, place and
manner restrictions in a public forum would only be upheld if the speech will
produce imminent and irreparable harm, and the regulation is the least
restrictive means of protecting against the harmful speech.3t 8
Because federal courts in recent years have become less willing to protect
students' rights of free speech, some change must take place to ensure that
students' rights are not being violated. Although the best solution to ensure
consistency for all students would be for the United States Supreme Court to
follow the precedents established by the Court over fifty years ago and to
move away from the public forum analysis in determining school speech
cases, it appears unlikely that any such changes will occur in the near future.
Because the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are unlikely to act to
vigilantly protect students free speech rights, it is necessary for students to
look to other sources for protection of their rights. State legislation and state
constitutions appear to provide the best chance for protection of student rights
in light of the most recent federal court decisions.

303. 201 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (quoting Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341,
346 (Cal. 1979)).

304. Id. at 846-47.
305. Id. The visitor center in question displayed the operation of the plant and had an
auditorium used for presentations. Id. at 841. The plaintiff, U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs
Conversion Project, sought to use the auditorium for an anti-nuclear presentation. Id. The
laboratory refused the plaintiff's request, so the Project sued. Id. at 841-42.
306. 859 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1993).
307. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish
his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall
ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press ... .
308. Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 6.
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CONCLUSION

In the landmark decision of Brown v. Boardof Education,3 9 the United
States Supreme Court announced that education "is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
31
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 1
Communication is an essential part of education, and students must be
encouraged to communicate instead of being discouraged to do so. By
allowing school regulations that restrict student speech, courts are in fact
discouraging students to be active communicators while they are in school.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have not remained true to the
commitment of vigilantly protecting students' constitutional rights of free
speech and ensuring that the American classroom remains the "marketplace
of ideas. 311 Because speech rights of students have become restricted and
courts have failed to uphold the constitutional rights granted to all individuals,
a great injustice has occurred in our schools.
HEATHER
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310.
311.

K. LLOYD

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Jd at 493.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603; see supra text accompanying note

